Serbia and Montenegro

Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - 2003
Released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor
February 25, 2004

Serbia and Montenegro (SaM) is a constitutional republic consisting of the relatively large Republic of Serbia and the much smaller Republic of Montenegro.* In March 2002, the two republics, with European Union (EU) mediation, negotiated the Belgrade Agreement, in which they agreed to redefine the joint state. On February 4, the Yugoslav Parliament adopted the Constitutional Charter and Implementation Law, marking the end of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and the beginning of the state union of Serbia and Montenegro. In the new state, almost all authority devolved to the two republics. The state union Government has responsibilities essentially limited to the Foreign Ministry, the military (VSCG, formerly the VJ), human and minority rights, and foreign economic and commercial relations. The SaM judiciary was constituted by year's end.

The military reports through the Defense Minister to the Supreme Defense Council (VSO), whose voting members are the Presidents of SaM, Serbia, and Montenegro. The military was largely depoliticized, and underwent sweeping reform after the Djindjic assassination. The VSO dismissed 26 of the approximately 65 flag officers and subordinated the General Staff to the civilian Defense Minister. (Previously, the Defense Ministry had acted only as an administrative appendage of the General Staff.) The Defense Minister replaced the heads of the two military intelligence services, refocused the Military Security Service (VSB) on its formal mission of crime fighting and counterintelligence and away from politics, and subordinated the VSB service to his office. (Previously, the VSB had reported informally to only the most senior political leaders.) Following the Djindjic assassination, the Government disbanded the Red Berets (Special Operations Unit or JSO); this paramilitary unit of the old secret police, the State Security Service (RDB), was implicated in the assassination.

The economy was in transition from a system based on social ownership to a market-based environment with a mix of industry, agriculture, and services. The population in the Republic of Serbia was 7.5 million, excluding Kosovo. Real SaM gross domestic product (GDP) grew by 4 percent in 2002; the International Monetary Fund projected 3 percent GDP growth during the year. Income distribution and economic opportunity were uneven. Poverty and unemployment were highest in southern Serbia and among the refugees from the wars in Croatia and Bosnia and internally displaced persons (IDPs) from Kosovo.

Serbia has a parliamentary system of government run by Prime Minister Zoran Zivkovic, who assumed the position in March following the assassination of Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic. Parliamentary elections held on December 28 were deemed generally free and fair by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE); the new, multiparty parliament had not met by year's end. The Serbian Constitution provides for an independent judiciary; however, the judiciary was often subject to political influence and corruption, and was inefficient.

While civilian authorities generally maintained effective control of security forces, there were some instances in which elements of the security forces acted independently of government authority. The Ministry of Interior (MUP) controls the Serbian police, who are responsible for internal security. The Security Intelligence Agency (BIA) is under the control of the Government as a whole, effectively giving control to the Prime Minister. Some members of security forces committed human rights abuses.

The Government generally respected the human rights of its citizens; however, there were problems in some areas, which were aggravated by the March assassination of Prime Minister Djindjic and subsequent 42-day State of Emergency. Police at times beat detainees and harassed citizens. Police produced results in investigations of high-level killings committed during and after the Milosevic era. There were incidents of arbitrary arrest and detention. The judiciary continued to be susceptible to political influence. Poor cooperation between the judiciary and other government branches slowed the implementation of legislative reforms. Courts remained administratively paralyzed, and lengthy trials persisted. Legislation creating a special domestic war crimes court was passed and a special prosecutor was appointed. Media independence was a problem; private libel suits, including from individuals active in politics, and indirect political manipulation contributed to self-censorship among journalists.

The SaM Parliament amended its Law on International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) Cooperation, which resulted in four voluntary surrenders of indictees and the arrest and transfer of another five indictees to The Hague. The Government transferred many documents to the ICTY and gave waivers for witnesses to testify; however, the ICTY remained dissatisfied with overall SaM cooperation, in particular because it believed that key indictee General Ratko Mladic was at large in Serbia.

There were several incidents of societal violence and discrimination against religious minorities. Violence and discrimination against women, Roma and other ethnic minorities were problems. Trafficking in women and children remained a problem which the Government took steps to address by adding trafficking in persons to the criminal code.

Considerable evidence indicated that on March 12 a group of nationalist paramilitaries and organized criminals assassinated Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic as the first step in a failed attempt to topple the Government. In accordance with the Constitution and laws, Djindjic's successors quickly declared a State of Emergency and launched a sweeping attack against the paramilitary unit and the organized crime gangs that allegedly killed the Prime Minister. The Government's imposition of a State of Emergency, which lasted 6 weeks, had broad support among the population and some international organizations, including the OSCE. On December 22, the trial of most of the conspirators responsible for the assassination, including the actual triggerman, began in the Belgrade Special Court for Fighting Organized Crime.

Over 10,000 individuals were detained during the State of Emergency. When it was lifted on April 22, approximately 4,500 remained in custody; at year's end, approximately 2,000 remained in custody. After the lifting of the State of Emergency, there were numerous allegations of police brutality and mistreatment, including the use of torture to extract confessions. The Government, which held most detainees in incommunicado detention without access to a lawyer or without being brought before a judge, has denied these allegations. The Government also increased restrictions on the media, the right to privacy, and the right of association during this period.

RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom from:
a. Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life

There were no reports of political killings committed by the Government or its agents; however, security forces killed nine individuals.

On March 7, police shot and killed two members of the so-called Albanian National Army (AKSh) during a failed attempt to place a bomb near the Kosovo Administrative Boundary Line. Authorities ruled that these shootings were justified because the suspects resisted arrest with arms.

On March 12, members of the Red Beretsacting--an autonomous state security police unit from the era of former FRY President Slobodan Milosevic--assassinated Prime Minister Djindjic, in collusion with the Zemun organized crime clan. The trial of the 44 people indicted in the assassination began on December 22.

On March 27, authorities killed Dusan "Siptar" Spasojevic and Milan Lukovic--both implicated in the Djindjic assassination-- during a shootout with police while the pair was resisting arrest. However, there were allegations that police executed the two after they were already in custody.

On September 30, a Kosovo veteran of the BIA in Nis allegedly shot to death four colleagues, wounding three others. He was arrested and awaiting trial at year's end.

There were some developments in police investigations of political killings from previous years. On September 16, the Belgrade Special Court for Fighting Organized Crime began the trial of two former police officers and five others (including two who remained at large) for the 2002 killing of former Belgrade police chief Bosko Buha. The December 17 testimony by a former Belgrade police inspector raised credible allegations that police framed those on trial for the Buha murder to cover for other crime figures who had connections to the Government at the time of the murder, including Milorad "Legija" Lukovic, accused of organizing the Djindjic assassination.

On March 28, the Government located the body of former Serbian President Ivan Stambolic, who disappeared in 2000. The Special Prosecutor for Organized Crime filed charges in September with the new Belgrade Special Court for Fighting Organized Crime in this case and in the 2000 attempted murder of Serbian Renewal Movement leader Vuk Draskovic (see Section 1.e.). Indictees include Milorad "Legija" Lukovic, Slobodan Milosevic, former RDB chief Radomir Markovic, former VJ Chief of Staff Nebojsa Pavkovic, and former Deputy RDB Chief Milorad Bracanovic.

On January 30, former RDB chief Radomir Markovic was sentenced to 7 years' imprisonment for the 1999 attempted murder of Vuk Draskovic, which resulted in the deaths of four persons. However, on September 30, after evidence emerged that additional people were involved in the attack, the Supreme Court set aside the District Court verdict, allowing for a re-trial that would include the additional defendants.

Domestic courts and the ICTY continued to adjudicate cases arising from crimes committed during the 1991-99 conflicts in Kosovo, Croatia and Bosnia, including the ICTY prosecution of former FRY and Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic (see Sections 1.e. and 4).

There were no deaths from landmine incidents during the year.
b. Disappearance

There were no reports of politically motivated disappearances.

During the year, SaM and Serbian Government authorities continued cooperation with neighboring countries and international organizations seeking to identify missing persons and investigating graves discovered in Serbia.

There were no exhumations during the year because the SaM Commission on Missing Persons, which replaced the FRY commission, was not established until November; however, Government authorities continued to make progress in identifying exhumed bodies. In 2002, the Serbian Government exhumed the last of the bodies from mass graves found in 2001; the graves contained bodies presumed to be those of ethnic Albanians killed in Kosovo and transferred to Serbia in 1999. Following identification of remains, Serbian authorities repatriated approximately 186 bodies to Kosovo during the year. The Serbian Government, in cooperation with international organizations and the International Commission on Missing Persons (ICMP), had not completed identification and repatriation of the remains by year's end.

Searching began for bodies thought to be located at the bottom of Lake Perucac in eastern Serbia. Another search revealed that there were no bodies under a highway near Vranje, a suspected gravesite.

c. Torture, and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

SaM and Serbian laws prohibit such practices; however, police at times abused citizens and detainees, particularly during the State of Emergency from March 12 to April 22.

Some people detained during the State of Emergency later claimed that they were beaten and tortured by police during their detention in an attempt to coerce statements. Reported forms of torture included: Asphyxiation with a plastic bag, electric shock, and mock executions. The London-based Institute for War and Peace Reporting (IWPR) alleged that on March 13 police arrested restaurant owner Milan Vukovic and took him to the "29 November" police station in Belgrade. Vukovic later testified that twice during his 1-month detention masked policemen placed a plastic bag over his head, puncturing the bag only after it was obvious that he was suffocating. According to Vukovic, the police demanded that he admit he was a drug dealer, racketeer and gun runner, and that he had traded illegally in oil, cigarettes, and foreign currency. Vukovic was later released without charges.

Sandra Petrovic informed Amnesty International that her husband, Goran Petrovic, and brother, Igor Gajic, were arrested in Krusevac on March 14 and kept in incommunicado detention until May 13. During this period, police allegedly tortured them to extract confessions of extortion. Mrs. Petrovic reported that after 15 days in detention in Krusevac, Goran Petrovic was transferred to Cuprija Prison, from where police took him to a nearby forest, taped a bag over his head and beat him so severely that he still had difficulty walking when she saw him on May 13. Also according to Mrs. Petrovic, police tortured Igor Gajic with electric shocks after dousing him with water, as well as taking him to a forest, taping a bag over his head, and beating him. Police have claimed that they have not verified cases of abuse, which were alleged to have occurred during the State of Emergency. At year's end, prosecutors had not yet acted on lawsuits filed by NGOs on behalf of individuals who claimed they were tortured as detainees during the State of Emergency.

Because detentions during the State of Emergency were generally incommunicado, human rights monitors witnessed little direct evidence of torture. The primary exception to the incommunicado nature of the detentions was the April 14-15 visit by the OSCE and the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) to detainees at the three major detention sites (Belgrade Central Police Station at 29 November Street and Belgrade Central and Military Prisons). The OSCE/OHCHR reported that during the visit to two prisons holding detainees, all those interviewed gave consistent statements of having been treated fairly by prison staff. However, the report also noted that, "the Delegation heard allegations or saw indications of torture or ill-treatment during arrest during the visit concerning two detainees."

Beatings and other physical abuse by police most often occurred during the arrest or initial detention period, and low-level criminals were most often the victims of such abuse. There were a few reports that police used beatings and threats to deter detainees from filing claims of abuse on prior occasions. In August, a man reported to the Humanitarian Law Center (HLC) that police beat him every day during a 30-day detention to pressure him to withdraw a previous claim of police brutality.

Police also reportedly used beatings to coerce confessions. The HLC filed a criminal complaint against unidentified officers of the Cacak Police Department claiming that on May 21, in an attempt to coerce a confession of robbery, the officers threatened Zeljko Popovic, slapped him, and struck him in the mouth, causing him to lose three teeth.

As in 2002, there were few reported instances of police harassment of ethnic Albanians in southern Serbia. The improvement can be credited largely to the deployment of the 400-member Multi-Ethnic Police Force throughout the area (see Section 1.d.).

In August 2002, police in Vranje severely beat Nenad Tasic, who sustained broken ribs, a punctured lung, and severe brain damage. The HLC filed a civil suit seeking compensation; the case was heard, but the judgment had not been announced at year's end. A separate criminal suit was ongoing at year's end.

During the year, the Leskovac-based Human Rights Committee reported that there were more than 100 cases of alleged police abuse in Leskovac. In March 2002, Leskovac police reportedly clubbed a handcuffed Roma man, Nebojsa Majlic, causing him to lose consciousness; afterwards, the police filed criminal charges against Majlic for interfering with police performance of duty. At year's end, the trial of Majlic had not begun.

Prison conditions generally met international standards; however, conditions varied greatly from one facility to another. The Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia (HCS) noted that some prisons offered clean, secure environments for inmates; however, in others--most notably the Belgrade Reformatory Hospital housing psychiatric prisoners--inmates were forced to live in filthy, inhumane conditions. The quality of food varied from poor to minimally acceptable, and health care was often inadequate. Basic educational and vocational training programs were in place at most prisons; however, they were limited by lack of resources. The level of training for guards was inadequate.

Men and women were held separately. Juveniles were supposed to be held separately from adults; however, in practice, this did not always happen. Pretrial detainees were held separately from convicted prisoners. Some inmates complained that they were subjected to intimidation and occasional assaults by other inmates. Inmates could report such problems to prison staff or to district court; authorities generally responded by placing inmates in separate cells and at times taking disciplinary measures such as placing offenders in solitary confinement. There were some deaths in prison due to murders between inmates, natural causes, and at least one suicide.

The Government permitted the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and local independent human rights monitors, including HCS, to visit prisons throughout the country and to speak with prisoners without the presence of a warden. The Government suspended prison visits by local human rights monitors during the State of Emergency; however, the OSCE and OHCHR visited two detention centers in Belgrade during that period.

There were reports that witnesses and potential witnesses cooperating with the ICTY experienced threats or intimidation in Serbia (see Section 4).

d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile

The Constitution prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention, and the Government generally observed these prohibitions, except during the State of Emergency.

The approximately 23,000 police officers are part of the Sector for Public Security of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MUP). The Sector is divided into seven directorates: Uniformed Police (including traffic and patrol officers), Criminal Investigations, Organized Crime, Analysis, Special Operations Units (including gendarmes and the Special Anti-Terrorist Unit, or SAJ), Human Resources and Training, and Border Police. The police are divided regionally into 33 secretariats. All municipal and rural units are branches of the Republic police. Effectiveness of the police is uneven and generally limited because of poor training, poor forensics, and the low education level of many officers. Although the MUP leadership changed after the October 2000 revolution, many police personnel, including some high-level officials, are holdovers from the Milosevic regime. While most police officers were Serbs, the force included Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims), ethnic Albanians, and other ethnic minorities. The Multi-Ethnic Police Force in southern Serbia was composed primarily of ethnic Albanians and Serbs.

There were only limited institutional means of overseeing and controlling police behavior. In September, an Inspector General with enforcement authority was installed in the MUP; however, at year's end, he still had little ability to conduct investigations. In April, the SaM Minister for Human and Minority Rights established an "SOS" hotline, which sought action on police abuse and other cases. The hotline had received more than 2,000 calls by year's end. The Serbian Government offered no other forms of assistance for citizens with complaints about police behavior; however, citizens could seek redress through the courts.

According to MUP figures, from January through June the MUP initiated 762 disciplinary proceedings, resulting in 17 arrests of policemen, 271 criminal complaints filed against 158 officers, and 123 suspensions. Included in these figures were four cases of illegal use of force, three in Sremska Mitrovica and one in Uzice. The three officers in Sremska Mitrovica were suspended during the ongoing disciplinary proceedings. Punishment for police officers rarely exceeded 6 months' imprisonment, a sentence that often allowed police officers found guilty of abusing human rights to rejoin the force. During the year, the MUP instituted an ethics code for police, but no sanctions were prescribed for violations.
Courts occasionally ordered the Government to pay compensation for police abuses. In March, Belgrade's First Municipal Court ordered the Republic of Serbia to pay approximately $1,780 (100,000 dinars) to Bojan Aleksov as compensation for his unlawful detention and torture in 2000.

Community policing was instituted during the year. The OSCE's Mission to SaM trained Serbian police cadets in modern police tactics at an international police training center in Mitrovo Polje.

The Criminal Procedure Code provides for strong regulations designed to protect the rights of detained and accused persons, including prohibitions against excessive delays by authorities in filing formal charges against suspects and in opening investigations; however, such delays continued regularly (see Section 1.e.).

The law restricts the time from indictment to the conclusion of first instance trial to 2 years; appeals to second instance courts must be completed within 1 additional year. A person wrongfully detained could demand rehabilitation and compensation from the Government. Bail was allowed but rarely used; detainees facing charges that carried possible sentences of less than 5 years could be released on their own recognizance. Due to the inefficiency of the courts, cases often took an excessively long time to come to trial; and, once started, trials often an excessively long time to conclude.

The police were authorized to make an arrest without a judge-authorized warrant in certain circumstances, including well-founded grounds of suspicion that the person committed a capital crime. An investigating judge must approve any detention of more than 48 hours, and arrested persons must be informed immediately of their rights, including the right to confidential conferences with a lawyer. Family members were normally able to visit detainees. No suspect could be detained for more than 3 months without a decision of an investigating judge, and no one could be detained for more than a total of 6 months. The law prohibits the use of force, threats, deception, and coercion, as well as use in court of evidence acquired by such means. During the State of Emergency, many false or unrealized promises of granting witness collaborator status--which would include the dropping of some charges--were made to encourage statements by detainees. Suspects' statements are valid in court only if they are made in the presence of counsel; an investigating judge or prosecutor must also be present. During the State of Emergency, appointed attorneys unfamiliar to detainees sometimes appeared solely for the taking of statements.

Among the special measures the Government included with the declaration of a State of Emergency was the suspension of the right to an attorney and permission for police to detain, for up to 30 days, any person "who is jeopardizing the safety of other citizens or the safety of the Republic." On April 11, as 30-day detentions made early in the State of Emergency were about to expire, the Parliament passed new measures permitting detentions on MUP authority of up to 90 days; however, the Constitutional Court declared the law unconstitutional on June 5 and on July 1 it was repealed by the Parliament. In practice, the 10,000 State of Emergency detainees were largely held incommunicado, without access to attorneys or family. Additionally, many of the detainees during the State of Emergency were never brought before a judge; however, those who later remained in jail were taken before a judge.

There were several reports of police detaining journalists for "informative talks" (see Section 2.a.).

The Constitution prohibits forced exile, and the Government did not employ it.

e. Denial of Fair Public Trial

The Constitution provides for an independent judiciary; however, the courts remained susceptible to corruption and political influence, although to a far lesser degree than under the former Milosevic regime.

The court system is made up of municipal and district courts, a supreme court, a constitutional court, and special courts for war crimes and organized crime. The Constitutional Court rules on the constitutionality of laws and regulations and relies on the authorities to enforce its rulings. The Law on Courts mandates the establishment of an administrative appeals court and a second instance appeals court to lighten the burden of the Supreme Court; however, these courts had not been established by year's end.

The courts were highly inefficient--cases could take years to resolve--and there were no official channels for alternative dispute resolution. However, the Government and judiciary made some progress in implementing the extensive organizational reforms mandated in the 2001 laws on courts, judges, and public prosecutors.

A Lustration Law, passed in June, prohibits anyone who has committed human rights violations since 1976 from holding public office for the next 2 to 5 years, depending on the gravity of the offense; however, the law had not been implemented by year's end.

In accordance with the Law on Courts, two new judicial bodies began functioning during the year: The High Judicial Council, which is staffed by Supreme Court justices and appoints judges, and the High Personnel Council, which disciplines and dismisses judges. The High Personnel Council, with approval of the Parliament, dismissed or forcibly retired 35 judges, mostly after the Djindjic assassination; however, there were no trials of former court presidents or judges who committed abuses during the Milosevic regime.

The Supreme Court President, under pressure from the Government, resigned in April; however, a majority of judges on the Supreme Court remained Milosevic appointees, and the Constitutional Court remained staffed by some judges appointed during the Milosevic regime. The Law on Judges mandates that judges have lifetime tenure with mandatory retirement at age 65.

The Judges' Training Center organized educational programs offered throughout the country. International organizations and local NGOs, including the HLC and the Belgrade Center for Human Rights (BCHR), also conducted training for judges during the year.

The law provides that defendants are presumed innocent and have the right to have an attorney represent them at public expense, if needed, and to be present at their trials. The courts also must provide interpreters, if required. Both the defense and the prosecution have the right to appeal a verdict. Defendants have a right to access government-held evidence and question witnesses; these rights were generally respected in practice.

In 2002, the Republic Prosecutor (Attorney General) submitted all public prosecutors, deputy prosecutors, and staff to review for general competency and previous conduct, including during the Milosevic era. As a result, approximately one-third of Public Prosecution personnel were dismissed or forced into retirement by the end of 2002. In April, the Republic Prosecutor himself was forced to resign, and six district prosecutors (including the Belgrade District Prosecutor) and a large number of lower-level prosecutors were dismissed or forced to resign during the year. Deputy Public Prosecutor Milan Sarajlic, who faced charges that he was paid by the Zemun organized crime clan, was released from jail due to poor health; at year's end, his trial had not yet been scheduled.

The SaM military court system, inherited from the Tito era, presents little transparency in its operations. In accordance with the Constitutional Charter, this system was phasing out operations, and military courts had no ongoing investigations or trials at year's end. The military court system retained one espionage case, which had been investigated but not yet taken to trial at year's end. Special departments in the Belgrade and Podgorica (Montenegro) District Courts, which would take on all new cases, had not been constituted at year's end. On October 20, the Supreme Military Court sentenced battalion commander Dragisa Petrovic to 9 years in prison and army reservists Nenad Stamenkovic and Tomica Jovic to 7 years each for the murder of an elderly Kosovo Albanian couple, Feriz and Rukija Drasnici, in 1999. The Court nearly doubled the sentences previously handed down by the Nis Military Court in 2002, following the revision of the indictments from murder charges to charges of war crimes against civilians. In addition to the nearly defunct military court system, the only other SaM court, the Court of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, had not been constituted at year's end. This court is expected to rule on disputes between the constituent republics or between the union and the republics, as well as on conformity of SaM or republic laws with the Constitutional Charter; it is also expected to respond to petitions of citizens whose rights or freedoms were violated by the Constitutional Charter.

There were no developments in the case of 24 Bosniaks whose 1993 political convictions of crimes against the state were returned for review by the Supreme Court in 1996.

Domestic war crimes indictments and trials began in the regular courts in 2002. On January 20, the trial began of one former member of the Bosnian Serb "Avengers" paramilitary and three members of the Bosnian Serb Army for abducting, torturing, and killing 16 Muslims from the Serbian town of Sjeverin in 1992. On September 29, the court sentenced Djordje Sevic to 15 years in prison, and Dragutin Dragicevic, Oliver Krsmanovic and ICTY indictee Milan Lukic--the last two remain at large--to 20-year prison sentences; this was the maximum term of imprisonment possible at the time.

In October 2002, Aleksandar "Sasa" Cvjetan went on trial in Prokuplje District Court for killing 19 ethnic Albanians in Podujevo, Kosovo, in March 1999. The Prokuplje Court also tried in absentia SAJ squad member Dejan Demirovic for cooperating with Cvjetan in the massacre. The Government had requested extradition of Demirovic from Canada, which had him in custody. In November 2002, citing concerns about security, fairness of proceedings, and access to ethnic Albanian witnesses, the Supreme Court transferred the trial from Prokuplje to Belgrade District Court, where proceedings resumed early in the year and were ongoing at year's end.
The Law on Suppression of Organized Crime created a semi-independent special prosecutor, a special police investigative unit, specialized court chambers, and a dedicated detention unit. Some human rights activists have expressed concern that the special police force's expanded powers to investigate and detain suspects could lead to abuse. The court's inaugural trial was held on September 16, when the Special Prosecutor for Organized Crime began presenting the case against the suspected killers of senior police officer Bosko Buha (see Section 1.a.). The trial was ongoing at year's end.

In July, the Parliament passed a law on domestic war crimes prosecutions, which established a special court for this purpose; however, the court had not begun functioning by year's end. It was scheduled to begin trials in March 2004. On July 22, Parliament appointed Vladimir Vukcevic as the special prosecutor for war crimes. The special court will be a branch of the Belgrade District Court; however, for security reasons it will use the facilities of the Belgrade Special Court for Fighting Organized Crime.

The ICTY was preparing to turn over to the Government prosecution of lower-level figures involved in the Vukovar massacre and has provided evidence in the case to the Justice Minister and the Special Prosecutor for War Crimes, who also began gathering evidence in the case.

Defendants can be tried in absentia. The Belgrade Special Court for Fighting Organized Crime was trying, in absentia, Slobodan Milosovic, on trial before the ICTY, and Milorad "Legija" Lukovic, a fugitive, for the murder of former Serbian President Ivan Stambolic and the attempted murder of Vuk Draskovic in 2000 (see Section 1.a.). The same court was trying Legija in absentia for the Djindjic assassination. There were no imprisonments based on trials in absentia.

Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence
The Constitution prohibits such actions; however, the Government at times infringed upon these rights in practice, particularly during the State of Emergency. The law gives the MUP control over the decision to monitor potential criminal activities. The Constitution includes restrictions on searches of persons and of premises; police must enter premises with a warrant, except to "save people and property." The Government generally respected these provisions in practice, with occasional exceptions. During the State of Emergency, the Government authorized searches without warrants in cases of suspected organized crime activity.

Most observers believed that the authorities selectively monitored communications and eavesdropped on conversations, read mail and e-mail, and wiretapped telephones. Members of political factions, presenting no direct evidence, accused other factions of using secret police and intelligence units to eavesdrop on them to gain political advantage. There were no reports during the year that the post office registered and tracked suspicious mail from abroad, as some believe occurred in the past; however, during the State of Emergency, the Government suspended rules on the secrecy of letters and other forms of communication.

The Government did not fulfill its promise to open to the public all secret files on persons collected under former regimes. The few files actually delivered to individuals who requested them had been cleansed of documents that might have contained sensitive reporting on the individuals.

During the year, the authorities evicted a number of Roma, including children, from two squatter settlements (see Section 5).

Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, including:

a. Freedom of Speech and the Press

SaM and Serbian law provide for freedom of speech and of the press; however, political pressure from various factions, an uncertain regulatory environment, and vulnerability to libel suits placed constraints on free expression by journalists, editors, and other media. There were some high-profile instances of apparent pressure on the media by senior government officials. The Government imposed substantial media restrictions during the State of Emergency.

Media independence remained a problem. Some observers believed that the continued lack of clear guidelines created an atmosphere unfriendly to free expression. Some media outlets clearly attempted to curry favor with the Government in hopes of receiving favorable treatment once new media reform laws are fully implemented; however, media outlets generally provided equal access to parties campaigning for the December parliamentary elections. Some media outlets practiced self-censorship and were reluctant to report on crimes perpetrated during the wars in Bosnia, Croatia, and Kosovo. Television coverage of the Milosevic trial at the ICTY tended to be incomplete or defensive, with the notable exception of Radio/TV B-92 (RTV B-92), which broadcast the proceedings live.

Selective privatization of media during the Milosevic era has left the country with a mixture of privately owned and fully or partially government-owned media outlets. The Government owned Borba, one of the most important printing houses in the country, and published the dailies Borba, Sport, and Vecernje Novosti. The oldest nationwide daily, Politika, was run by several state-run companies and was influenced by the Government, although German media giant WAZ became a co-owner during the year. Print media also included the independent daily Danas, weeklies Vreme and Nin, high-circulation tabloids Blic and Glas Javnosti, and other newspapers.

The Government funded a Hungarian language newspaper, and state-owned media outlet Radio Television of Serbia (RTS) provided some Hungarian language programming. Tanjug was a state-owned news agency that many television stations rely on for their news information.

The 2002 Law on Broadcasting created a regulatory framework designed to foster free and independent media. This law mandated formation of an independent Broadcast Council to transform RTS into a public broadcasting service and to allot radio and TV frequencies. The Broadcast Council was established during the year, but the Parliament's violation of provisions for appointing candidates damaged the Council's legitimacy and led to the resignation of two members. The Council began limited functioning during the year.

State-controlled RTS was a major presence in television and radio. Aside from the three RTS channels, the Government had considerable influence, although not formal control, over some other major television stations, including: TV Politika, TV Novi Sad, and YU INFO (phasing out operations due to bankruptcy), as well as Radio Belgrade's three stations. RTS's coverage was generally objective; however, it occasionally demonstrated some bias in favor of the ruling Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS) coalition. Management personnel could be politically influenced, since the Government appointed editors-in-chief.

Two major private TV stations, BK and TV Pink, which received advantageous treatment, including frequencies, under the Milosevic regime, had widespread coverage. TV Pink, the most widely watched station in the country, has shown editorial bias in favor of the Government since 2000. After the Government granted RTV B-92 a temporary license to broadcast republic-wide pending the final allocation of frequencies in 2002, the media outlet set up new transmitters to make itself a national channel that could compete with TV Pink and BK. However, Editor-in-Chief of RTV B-92 Veran Matic reported that Deputy Prime Minister Cedomir Jovanovic warned him that his media outlet would never get radio or television frequencies if it did not change its reporting. Approximately 300 TV stations and 700 radio stations that operated independently had to work under temporary licenses or without any legal basis.

During the State of Emergency, the Government prohibited the publication, broadcast or dissemination of information about the reasons for declaring the State of Emergency and implementation of the State of Emergency, except for the carrying of official statements. Sanctions established for violating the prohibition were fines of $915 to $9,150 (50,000 to 500,000 dinars) for the offending legal entities and $183 to $1,830 (10,000 to 100,000 dinars) for the responsible person within an offending entity, as well as possible temporary prohibition of publication of newspapers or broadcast of offending radio or television programs. No appeal was permitted. Television Leskovac was fined $5,490 (300,000 dinars) for violating the media decree under the State of Emergency. The Government also temporarily banned and fined a local television station, RTV Mars $9,150 (500,000 dinars) for the station, $1,830 (100,000 dinars) for the director. Distribution in Serbia of the Montenegrin weekly Dan was banned during the State of Emergency.

Some other sanctions went beyond those included in media decrees. During the State of Emergency, the Government permanently banned two newspapers. One of these was the weekly Identitet, believed to be financed in part by Milorad "Legija" Lukovic, the organized crime figure and former Red Beret commander suspected of organizing the Djindjic assassination. The Government permanently banned the daily Nacional (which later reopened as Balkan), arguing that its anti-Djindjic campaign had created an "atmosphere of lynching" which "facilitated the assassination." After the State of Emergency, the Government banned one edition of the weekly Svedok because it ran excerpts of a Macedonian newspaper interview glorifying "Legija."

In a joint April 24 letter, editors-in-chief of major media called on the Government to discuss with them sources of tension, which were exacerbated during the State of Emergency. The letter cited as issues of concern: Restrictions on reporting during the State of Emergency, threats by some government officials against editors, and other forms of government interference. At a meeting in early May, editors-in-chief and Government representatives exchanged views on the State of Emergency; the Government also agreed to repeal a 20 percent tax on printed media.
Radio stations owned or organized by municipalities pressured local journalists not to report on municipal government problems.

There were several instances of police calling in journalists for "informative talks." Police called in Veselin Simonovic, Editor-in-Chief of Blic, and asked him to identify a source. Similarly, Blic News Editor-in-Chief Jovica Krtinic was called in and asked to tell the police who had given him a police document from an ongoing investigation. As was the case with Simonovic, when Krtinic declined to comply, the police took no further action.

There were no reports of extremist groups targeting journalists during the year. According to Belgrade's Association of Independent Electronic Media (ANEM), police did not attempt to find the source of the threats against Blic News editor Zeljko Cvijanovic in 2002.

Libel remained a criminal offense. Although no suits were filed directly by the Government, the low threshold defining libel enabled individual government officials, as well as former members of the Milosevic regime, to win private cases against media outlets that criticized them. Libel can result in jail terms, and courts have the power to issue "conditional sentences" that silence offending journalists with the threat that any further offense will lead to immediate imprisonment. However, there were no reports of "conditional sentences" being issued to journalists.

In November, Internal Affairs Minister Dusan Mihajlovic filed defamation charges against Mladjan Dinkic of the G-17 Plus political party, which alleged that Mihajlovic had secured a lucrative government contract with his ministry for one of his companies; Mihajlovic filed similar charges against Verica Barac, head of the Government's Anti-Corruption Council, and editors-in-chief of TV B-92 and dailies Glas Javnosti and Kurir, for discussing or covering the allegation. At year's end, the prosecutor had taken no action on the lawsuits.

During the State of Emergency, Government communications director Vladimir "Beba" Popovic filed libel suits seeking approximately $18,300 to $54,900 (1 to 3 million dinars) for emotional harm against five media outlets which had questioned his status as the Government's communications director--daily newspapers Vecernje Novosti and Blic News, weekly news magazines Nin and Vreme, and television station B-92. Vecernje Novosti paid a judgement of $18,300 (1 million dinars). Blic News paid a judgment of $915 (50,000 dinars) and court costs of $92 (5000 dinars). The other cases remained ongoing at year's end.

In 2002, businessman Dragan Tomic began libel proceedings against RTS reporter Dragana Vasiljevic for the offense of reading on the air Tomic's official bank statements; Tomic later withdrew the charges. In 2002, Democratic Party member Radisav Ljubisavljevic initiated libel proceedings against B-92 for broadcasting public statements made by various political parties about him; at year's end, he was discussing with B-92 possibly withdrawing the charges.

According to the HLC and the BCHR, journalists practiced self-censorship because of possible libel suits and fear of offending public opinion, particularly on subjects relating to wars in the former Yugoslavia.

On April 22, Parliament adopted the Public Information Law, which covers both rights and responsibilities of the media. Topics in the Law include: Freedom of the media, a ban on censorship, a ban on media monopolies, a due diligence requirement in reporting, a reduced right to privacy for public officials, and the rights of persons referred to in disseminated information. Immediately before adoption, the Parliament added articles authorizing the banning of dissemination of information if necessary to prevent: Calls for violent overthrow of the constitutional order; undermining of the territorial integrity of the Republic; war propaganda; or incitement to violence, hatred or discrimination.

The Government did not restrict publishing or import of published materials. Jehovah's Witnesses reported that they no longer experienced problems importing their religious literature.

The Government did not restrict access to the Internet; however, there were reports that Government selectively monitored e-mail correspondence (see Section 1.f.).

The Government did not restrict academic freedom. The 2002 Law on Universities, designed to protect universities from political interference, restricted police entry onto university campuses and restored the Education Council (Prosvetni Savet) abolished by Milosevic in 1998. The Republic-level Council was under the control of the Parliament, set general university policy, made some administrative decisions, and determined general curricular goals. In accordance with the Law on Universities, the Scientific-Educational Council (Naucno-Nastavno Vece) selected university rectors and faculty deans without interference from the Ministry of Education. The Law also provides for participation of student organizations in determining certain aspects of university policy; at year's end, these organizations were still defining their policy role.

b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association

The Constitution provides for freedom of assembly, and the Government generally respected this right in practice, except during the State of Emergency. During the State of Emergency, the Government prohibited the calling and holding of public gatherings. Also prohibited were political, union, and other actions intended to disrupt and prevent the realization of measures taken during the State of Emergency.

The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the Government generally respected this right in practice; however, on June 9, Belgrade police, acting on a municipal court order, closed the campaign office of a citizen's organization that was conducting a petition drive in favor of property restitution legislation. Two of the organization's leaders, who refused to leave the premises, were arrested and later released without charge. The citizen's organization had been a vocal opponent of the Belgrade Municipality's practice of auctioning property that was subject to potential claims by the original owners and their heirs.

The Government required private organizations to register; however, no problems with registration were reported during the year.

c. Freedom of Religion

The SaM and Serbian constitutions and laws provide for freedom of religion, and the state union and republican Governments generally respected this right in practice. There is no state religion in SaM; however, the Serbian Orthodox Church received some preferential treatment.

The status of respect for religious freedom in the SaM and Serbian Governments improved during the year, and the Federal Secretariat for Religious Affairs was disbanded. In addition to including freedom of conscience and religious practice in its founding documents, in March the SaM Government set up an office dedicated to religious affairs within the Ministry for Human and Minority Rights. The office focused on outreach to minority religious communities, and representatives of these communities reported good relations with this office.

While there is no formal registration requirement for religions, religious groups and all other groups planning to hold gatherings are required to register with local police. Religious groups also could register as citizen groups with the MUP to gain the status of juridical person necessary for real estate and other administrative transactions. The Government rescinded the citizen group registration of one religious group--The Sanatan Society for Spiritual Science--claiming that Sanatan documents included tenets promoting criminality.

The Belgrade Islamic community reported continued difficulties in acquiring land and government approval for an Islamic cemetery near the city. Representatives of the Islamic Community of Novi Pazar, in contrast, continued to report good relations with the Government.

The Government did not grant special visas to missionaries, who had to obtain residence permits or to leave the country every 3 months to renew their status.

The armed forces continued to offer only Serbian Orthodox services; however, members of other faiths may attend religious services outside their posts.

Religious education in primary and secondary schools continued during the year. Students were required either to attend classes from one of the seven "traditional religious communities" or to substitute a class in civic education. The proportion of students registering for religious education grew during the year; however, registrations for civic education courses continued to predominate. Some Protestant leaders and NGOs continued their objection to the teaching of religion in public schools, as well as to proposals to classify some of the Republic's religions as traditional.

There was no progress noted during the year on restitution of previously seized church property.

Religion and ethnicity are intertwined closely throughout SaM; thus, in many cases it was difficult to identify discriminatory acts as primarily religious or primarily ethnic in origin.

Propaganda against sects continued in the press, and religious leaders noted that instances of vandalism often occurred soon after such press reports (see Section 5). According to some sources, the situation was further complicated because one of Serbia's leading experts on sects was a police captain whose works were used in military and police academies.

In April, an Adventist pastor in Zrenjanin, Josip Tikvicki, responded to the sound of his church windows breaking and was subsequently severely beaten. According to church sources, the same church had been the scene of a number of attacks the previous year, but the vandals had never been caught. Following this attack, a representative of the SaM Ministry of Human and Minority Rights visited the hospitalized cleric and publicly condemned the incident. Three persons were sentenced to several months in jail for the attack.
A representative of Belgrade's Islamic community claimed that two individuals were killed in March because of their Islamic identity. One of the victims was the grandson of a former Belgrade Imam, while the other was a Muslim Roma inmate in prison in Pozarevac who reportedly was killed by other inmates.

Novi Sad police failed to respond to repeated complaints by members of the Muslim Gujak family that over a period of 3 years they had been threatened, insulted, and on one occasion assaulted by their Serb neighbor. The HLC filed a criminal complaint against the neighbor, Vujic, for abusing the Gujaks on ethnic grounds; at year's end the trial had not begun.

Minority religious communities reported continued problems with vandalism of church buildings, cemeteries and other religious premises. Many of the attacks involved spray-painted graffiti, rock throwing, or the defacing of tombstones; however, a number of cases involved much more extensive damage. In May, a Molotov cocktail was thrown at a Sanatan residence outside Belgrade. There were approximately 10 incidents in which gravestones were desecrated, including those in Jewish, Catholic, Islamic and Lutheran cemeteries. One of the largest instances of desecration occurred in September when youths defaced an estimated 80 graves in a Catholic cemetery in Vojvodina. Suspects were apprehended shortly after the incident; however, no judicial proceedings were initiated during the year.

Jewish leaders reported an increase in anti-Semitism, both in the media and in acts of vandalism, such as the destruction of gravestones. According to representatives of the Union of Jewish Communities of SaM, anti-Semitic hate speech often appeared in small-circulation books (see Section 5). The release of new books (or reprints of translations of anti-Semitic foreign literature) often led to a spike in hate mail and other expressions of anti-Semitism.

There have been a number of continuances in the Savic case, in which an author of anti-Semitic literature was tried for spreading racial or national hatred. The latest continuance, granted to allow for a psychiatric examination of the defendant, was ongoing at year's end.

While in previous years Jehovah's Witnesses reported that their members were serving sentences for conscientious objection to the draft, they reported no such detainees during the year. Moreover, the SaM Government began to implement civilian service as an alternative to mandatory army service. Civilian service options complement the non-lethal options already present for conscripts who object to military service for reasons of conscience. Some journalists questioned whether conscientious objector regulations will extend to adult converts who wish to leave the ready reserve.

For a more detailed discussion, see the 2003 International Religious Freedom Report.

d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation

The Constitution provides for these rights, and the Government generally respected them in practice.

Bosniaks crossing into Serbia from Bosnia no longer reported being subjected to lengthy searches by border police.

On October 6, Bosnian Minister for Human Rights and Refugees, Mirsad Kebo, and SaM Minister for Human and Minority Rights, Rasim Ljajic, signed an agreement and protocol on the return of refugees; the agreement creates a mechanism to exchange information through announcements of returns, provides for joint projects, and creates a Working Group as a consultative body.

The conflicts that occurred in Bosnia, Croatia, and Kosovo led to widespread displacement of persons. There were approximately 216,000 IDPs from Kosovo in Serbia, mainly Serbs, Roma, and Bosniaks. Most Serb IDPs from Kosovo rented inadequate lodgings or were housed with host families or relatives; however, approximately 9,000 remained in collective centers which foreign observers found to be inadequate for any purpose other than emergency shelter. Collective centers were a drain on government resources. It was impossible to estimate unemployment figures among IDPs; most families have moved three times or more in search of better schooling or employment opportunities. It is probable that many of them were employed either fully or part-time in the informal sector, such as working in one of the many gray economy firms manufacturing clothes, furniture and other products. The Government, with support of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), worked on closing 115 collective centers housing refugees (not IDPs) from Bosnia and Croatia by setting qualifications to remain housed in collective centers and seeking alternate housing for others.

The great majority of the approximately 10,000 IDPs who fled into Kosovo during the 2001 crisis in southern Serbia returned to their homes in Bujanovac, Presevo, and Medvedja municipalities following the implementation of the 2001 Covic plan.

The UNHCR estimated that there were 40,000 to 45,000 displaced Roma living in Serbia proper, as many Kosovar Roma were perceived as Serb collaborators during the Kosovo conflict and so could not safely return there. Living conditions for Roma in Serbia were, on the whole, extremely poor. Local municipalities often were reluctant to accommodate them, hoping that if they failed to provide shelter, the Roma would not remain in the community (see Section 5). If Roma did settle, it was most often in official collective centers with minimum amenities or, more often, in makeshift camps on the periphery of major cities or towns.

The SaM and Serbian Constitutions provide for the granting of refugee status (at the Republic level) or asylum status (at the SaM level) to persons who meet the definition in the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. In practice, the Government provided protection against refoulement and provided refugees status and asylum. The Government cooperated with the UNHCR and other humanitarian organizations assisting refugees. There were approximately 317,000 refugees in Serbia from other successor nations of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Of these refugees, most (212,000) were from Croatia. The great majority of the several thousand ethnic Albanians who fled into Serbia in 2001 to escape the conflict in Macedonia have returned to their homes in Macedonia.

The Government also provides temporary protection to certain individuals who do not qualify as refugees or asylees.

Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of
Citizens to Change Their Government

The SaM Constitutional Charter provides citizens with the right to change their government peacefully, and citizens exercised this right in practice through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of universal suffrage. SaM and the Serbian Republic each have a parliamentary system of government. In SaM, the president is elected by the SaM Parliament; in Serbia, the president is elected by direct vote.

On November 17, Serbian presidential elections failed because turnout did not meet the required 50 percent threshold; this was the third failed attempt to elect a President since 2002. Nonetheless, the OSCE concluded that the elections were generally free and fair; however, significant challenges remained, particularly with regard to the legislative framework for elections.

On November 13, acting on a Government proposal, Natasa Micic, the Speaker of Parliament and acting President of Serbia, dissolved Parliament in the face of legislative gridlock and pending votes of confidence on her performance and on the Government. Parliamentary elections held on December 28 were generally free and fair, despite some legislative shortcomings. The Serbian Radical Party--whose leader Vojislav Seselj faced war crimes charges before the ICTY--won a plurality (82 of 250 seats); however, democratic parties together controlled more than half of the seats. At year's end, the new parliament had not met, and the new government had not been formed.

There were irregularities in one parliamentary vote. In December, Boris Tadic, a leader of the Democratic Party (DS), admitted that a vote was cast on behalf of a DS Member of Parliament who was not in fact present when Parliament approved the nomination of Kori Udovicki as National Bank Governor on July 22. Votes may also have been cast on behalf of two absent members of another political party when Udovicki was approved. In May, the Constitutional Court ruled that Members of Parliament who left their parties were entitled to retain their parliamentary seats. The parliament did not implement this decision by year's end, leading the Court to reprimand the Parliament several times.

At the local level, there were a few by-elections during the year; these were generally free and fair. The 2002 Law on Local Self-Government instituted direct election of mayors and enlarged competencies for municipal and city governments, including greater flexibility in recapturing tax revenue for local needs. The law also increased citizens' ability to participate directly in local government by giving them the right to undertake civil initiatives and organize local referendums.

There were 10 women in the 126-seat SaM Parliament and 27 women in the 250-seat Serbian Parliament. There were three women in the Serbian Cabinet. Women were very active in political organizations; however, they only held approximately 10 percent of ministerial-level and parliamentary positions in the Serbian and SaM Governments. Prominent positions held by women during the year included: Speaker of the Serbian Parliament (who was also Acting President of Serbia); the deputy Speaker, Serbian Ministers for Social Welfare, for Transportation and Telecommunication, and for Environment; President of the Serbian Supreme Court; Central Bank Governor; and Mayor of Belgrade.

There were no legal restrictions on minority participation in political life. There were 20 minorities in the 250-seat Serbian Parliament. There was one minority in the Serbian cabinet, and two minorities in the SaM cabinet. The two largest ethnic groups, Serbs and Montenegrins, dominated the country's political leadership. A coalition of ethnic parties was unable to enter parliament because it did not meet the 5 percent threshold of votes in the December Parliamentary elections; however, members of minority groups were on slates of non-ethnically based parties, and some of these individuals were likely to enter parliament when parties allotted seats to individuals on their slates. Some minorities, such as Hungarians and Bosniaks, turned out to vote in parliamentary elections in percentages roughly equal to or greater than the general population; however, Roma continued their historical pattern of low voter turnout, and very few ethnic Albanians participated in the December 28 parliamentary election.
In Vojvodina, where the Hungarian minority constituted approximately 15 percent of the population, many regional political offices were held by Hungarians. Jozsef Kasza, a Hungarian minority party leader, was a Deputy Prime Minister of Serbia. Ethnic Hungarians led municipal governments in Subotica and six other municipalities in northern Vojvodina. Few members of other ethnic groups were involved at the top levels of government or the economy; however, two Sandzak Muslims served in the 5-person SaM Cabinet. In the Sandzak, Bosniaks controlled the municipal governments of Novi Pazar, Tutin, and Sjenica. Roma had the right to vote, and there were two small Romani parties in Serbia. One of the four deputy mayors in Kragujevac was Roma.

The 2002 Law on Local Elections instituted a proportional system of voting guaranteeing multi-ethnic representation in government. These legislative changes led to the election, in July 2002, of ethnic Albanian mayors and Albanian-led multi-ethnic municipal assemblies in the municipalities of Bujanovac and Presevo. However, the direct election of mayors was not instituted in some subsequent municipal by-elections in other areas, which followed earlier law. The Serbian Republic's 2002 Omnibus Bill on Vojvodina granted increased powers of self-government to the historically distinct Vojvodina region of Serbia, although the law stopped far short of restoring the full autonomy that Vojvodina Province enjoyed until 1989.

Ethnic groups established 10 minority councils, in accordance with the February 2002 FRY Law on Protection of the Rights and Liberties of National Minorities (see section 5).

Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged
Violations of Human Rights

A number of domestic and international human rights groups generally operated without government restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on human rights cases. Government officials generally were cooperative and responsive to their views; however, during the State of Emergency, the Government suspended HCS visits to inmates. Some NGOs, such as the G-17 Institute, Lex, Otpor, and the Center for Free and Democratic Elections (CeSID) contributed to the Government's reform strategies at the highest level. NGOs such as the HLC, Yugoslav Lawyer's Committee for Human Rights (YUCOM), and HCS frequently offered citizens their only chance for redress when government institutions failed to protect basic human rights. Human rights NGOs were highly independent in their assessments of government actions. HLC, YUCOM, BCHR, the Leskovac Human Rights Committee, and the Center for Antiwar Action researched human rights abuses throughout the country. HCS and BCHR published annual surveys on human rights issues in SaM. In the Sandzak region, two committees monitored abuses against the local Muslim population. Most of these organizations offered advice and help to victims of abuse.

There were a few incidents of government interference with the HLC. Vladimir "Beba" Popovic filed a libel suit against the HLC for questioning the legitimacy of his status as the Government's communications director (see Section 2.a.). Additionally, police at a rally for missing persons failed to protect the HLC director from repeated pushing by a small group of opponents, and the MUP threatened to file assault charges against the HLC director for slapping one of the individuals who was pushing her to the ground.

The Government worked in partnership with international and local NGOs in a number of areas affecting human rights during the year, including monitoring of elections (CeSID), monitoring of official corruption (Otpor), legal and judicial reform (YUCOM, HLC, HCS), the drafting of the new criminal code (BCHR), judicial education (HLC, BCHR), return of refugees and IDPs (Serbian Democratic Forum, HCS), identification of missing persons (ICMP), and the fight against human trafficking (Astra, Counseling Center against Family Violence).

The SaM and Serbian Governments made progress in their cooperation with the ICTY; however, the ICTY remained dissatisfied with overall SaM cooperation, in particular because it believed that key indictee General Ratko Mladic was at large in Serbia. The ICTY issued indictments against four additional Serb nationals during the year. At year's end, approximately 16 ICTY indictees with ties to the country remained at large. The ICTY stated its disappointment that the Government had not been able to arrest such persons, in particular former Bosnian Serb leader Ratko Mladic.

On April 14, the SaM Parliament strengthened the legal framework for cooperation with the ICTY by amending the 2002 Federal Law on Cooperation with the ICTY. The principal amendment was the removal of Article 39, which held that the law applied only to existing indictments. A number of indictees were transferred to ICTY custody, some following arrests and some following their surrender to authorities. Serbian President Milan Milutinovic surrendered to the ICTY at the conclusion of his mandate in January. Radical Party leader Vojislav Seselj surrendered when his indictment was made public in February. Cooperation on indictees improved markedly after the March assassination of Prime Minister Djindjic. Secret Police chief Jovica Stanisic and Red Beret founder Franko "Frenki" Simatovic, both arrested during the State of Emergency, were indicted by the ICTY and transferred to The Hague in June. Miroslav Radic and Veselin Sljivancanin--the remaining members of the "Vukovar Three" still at large--were transferred in May and July, respectively. (Sljivancanin's arrest sparked a day of public protest. During the year, the ICTY began trying the Vukovar defendants for the killing of more than 200 civilians and POWs who were patients in a hospital in Croatia in 1991. Zeljko Meakic and Mitar Rasevic surrendered and were transferred to the ICTY in the summer. Serbian police arrested Vladimir "Rambo" Kovacevic in September; he was transferred to the ICTY on October 23.

The ICTY continued trials against Serb defendants for war crimes and crimes against humanity committed during the 1991-99 conflicts in Kosovo, Croatia, and Bosnia, including against former FRY President Slobodan Milosevic.

In October, the ICTY made public indictments against four Serbian generals. One of these indictees, General Djordjevic, was believed to be in Russia. The three other indictees remained at large in Serbia at year's end. Although government officials were believed to have made private overtures to the generals to surrender themselves to the ICTY, there was no government effort to arrest and transfer these indictees to the ICTY.

SaM and Serbian Governments have made progress in compliance with document requests from the ICTY and in facilitation of the testimony of witnesses. SaM's National Cooperation Council (NCC) transferred hundreds of pages of documents to the ICTY's Office of the Prosecutor, including minutes of meetings of the FRY Supreme Defense Council from 1991-99, as well as minutes from closed sessions of the Serbian Parliament. However, a number of requests from the ICTY remained outstanding at year's end. The NCC enabled the testimony of numerous witnesses through the granting of waivers that freed potential witnesses from local prosecution under state secrets laws. However, there were threats and intimidation in Serbia against potential ICTY witnesses.

During the year, domestic war crimes indictments and trials continued in Serbia (see Section 1.e.).

There was no autonomous human rights ombudsman at either the SaM or the Republic level; however, the Vojvodina Province established an ombudsman position, and the Vojvodina Parliament approved Petar Teofilovic as ombudsman in September.

The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) founded by President Kostunica in 2001 was dissolved, along with many other federal institutions, when the FRY ceased to exist in February. Prior to its dissolution, it organized several public events, including an exhibit of photography from the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s.

Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Disability,
Language, or Social Status

SaM and Serbian laws provide for equal rights for all citizens, regardless of ethnic group, language, or social status, and prohibit discrimination against women; however, in practice, the legal system provided little protection for such groups.

Women

Violence against women was a problem, and high levels of domestic violence persisted. By one estimate, half of all women suffered physical or emotional abuse. The few official agencies dedicated to coping with family violence had inadequate resources; however, public recognition of the problem has increased. In 2002, the Federal Criminal Code was amended to make spousal rape a criminal offense. Few victims of spousal abuse filed complaints with the authorities. Victim accusations are not required for prosecution of domestic violence cases, and prosecutions of such cases did occur during the year. According to a victim's rights advocate, police response to domestic violence improved markedly; a number of police officers provided assistance to female victims of violence and detained offenders to protect victims.

The Center for Autonomous Women's Rights in Belgrade offered a rape and spousal abuse hotline, and sponsored a number of self-help groups. The Center also offered assistance to refugee women (mostly Serb), many of who experienced extreme abuse or rape during the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia. The Counseling Center Against Family Violence operated a domestic violence shelter.
Trafficking in women for the purpose of sexual exploitation remained a problem (see Section 6.f.).

While women's social status was not equal to men's, women served, in significant positions and numbers, in government, politics and professional occupations, though they were not well represented in commerce. In urban areas, such as Belgrade, Nis, and Novi Sad, women were represented widely in many professions including law, academia, and medicine. Women were also active in journalism, politics, and human rights organizations. Since changing regulations to allow women to serve as police officers in 2001, the police hired increasing numbers of women officers. Women legally were entitled to equal pay for equal work; however, according to the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, women's average wage was 11 percent lower than the average wage of men. Women were granted paid maternity leave for 1 year, with an additional 6 months of unpaid leave available.

Traditional patriarchal ideas of gender roles, particularly in rural areas, subjected women to discrimination in many homes. In remote rural areas, particularly among some minority communities, women effectively lacked the ability to exercise their right to control property. In rural areas and some minority communities, it was common for husbands to direct the voting of wives.

Children

The Government attempted to meet the health and educational needs of children. The educational system provided 9 years of free, mandatory schooling. However, economic distress affected children adversely in both the education and health care systems, particularly Roma children, who rarely attended kindergarten. Many Roma children never attended primary school, either for family reasons, because they were judged to be unqualified, or because of societal prejudice. Due to this lack of primary schooling, many Roma children did not learn to speak Serbian. Some Roma children were placed mistakenly in schools for children with emotional disabilities because Roma language and cultural norms made it difficult for them to succeed on standardized tests in Serbian. During the year, 29 elementary and secondary schools offered weekly Roma language and culture classes, and the SaM Ministry for Human and Minority Rights provided free textbooks to Roma children; however, there were reports that not all Roma children received a complete set of textbooks.

It was estimated that approximately 30 percent of children were abused. While teachers were instructed to report suspected child abuse cases, they often did not do so. Police were generally responsive to complaints, and prosecutions of child abuse cases occurred during the year. Psychological and legal assistance was available for victims and there was an incest trauma center. Also, victims who were with their mothers could stay in the domestic violence shelter.

Trafficking of children for the purpose of sexual exploitation remained a problem (see Section 6.f.). There were reports that some Roma children were trafficked within the Roma community in Serbia and to other Roma abroad to be used in begging and theft rings.

Persons with Disabilities

The law prohibits discrimination against persons with disabilities in employment, education, or in the provision of other state services; however, in practice, facilities for persons with mental or physical disabilities were inadequate, and addressing this problem was not a priority for the Government. There were specialized schools for persons with disabilities, but no special facilities or assistance was available for higher education. There was no widespread employment discrimination against persons with disabilities; however, a high unemployment rate and lack of accommodations for persons with disabilities made employment difficult. The law mandates access for persons with disabilities to new official buildings, and the Government generally enforced this provision in practice. As sidewalks were replaced, the Government installed wheelchair ramps at intersections. The Government did not provide mobile voting for handicapped or ill voters incapable of coming to polling stations, and in Serbian presidential and parliamentary elections absentee ballots were not allowed, effectively disenfranchising many persons with disabilities.

National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities

Minorities constituted 25 to 30 percent of Serbia's population, and included Hungarians, Bosniaks, Roma, Slovaks, Romanians, Vlachs, Bulgarians, Croats, Albanians, and others.

Although some problems persisted, the SaM and Serbian governments' policies toward minorities improved greatly since Milosevic's removal from office. SaM and Hungary signed a bilateral agreement designed to protect national minorities on both sides of the border. SaM Minister for Human and Minority Rights, Rasim Ljajic, led a public education campaign for ethnic tolerance, and his "Tolerancija" organization hosted a seminar of youths from around the former FRY. His ministry ran an "SOS" hotline for minorities and others concerned about human rights problems.

Sporadic, ethnically motivated attacks continued in southern Serbia. This region, which encompasses the municipalities of Presevo, Bujanovac, and Medvedja, has the largest concentration of ethnic Albanians in Serbia proper and had been an area of significant ethnic unrest in 2000-01. A strong police presence remained in southern Serbia due, in part, to credible threats of violent acts by radical elements of the ethnic Albanian community. There were few reports of police harassment against the ethnic Albanian population, and there were no reports of physical abuse or brutality; however, police killed two ethnic Albanians during an attempted arrest (see Section 1.a.).

The trial of four persons for the 1992 Sjeverin killings was the first trial concerning past government abuses of Muslim citizens of the Sandzak and yielded three 20-year sentences and one 15-year sentence (see Section 1.e.).

There were no reports of violence or harassment against ethnic Hungarians in Vojvodina during the year. However, on September 27, graves were desecrated in a predominantly Hungarian Catholic cemetery (see Section 2.c.). Some members of the Vlach community in Bor complained about the Serbian Orthodox Church's refusal to conduct religious services in the Vlach language rather than in Serbian.

Roma continued to be targets of numerous incidents of police violence, verbal and physical harassment from ordinary citizens, and societal discrimination. Police often did not investigate cases of societal violence against Roma. In September, police briefly detained two persons for beatings of Roma. HLC filed a criminal complaint in the case; however, the case did not go to court by year's end.

The Federal Minorities Law recognizes the Roma as a national minority. It explicitly bans discrimination and calls for government measures to improve Roma's conditions. The SaM Human and Minority Rights Ministry has a four-person section, currently funded by the OSCE, dedicated to Roma issues. Many Roma lived illegally in squatter settlements that lacked basic services such as schools, medical care, water, and sewage facilities. Some of these settlements were located on valuable industrial or commercial sites where private owners wanted to resume control; others were on the premises of socially owned enterprises due to be privatized. There was one report of demolition of a Roma settlement during the year. According to HLC, 52 Roma families were evicted from an illegal settlement in Belgrade on May 19, and bulldozers destroyed their homes. The building inspectors of Cukarica municipality ordered the demolition of the settlement in which approximately 250 Roma, mostly displaced from Kosovo, lived. According to the Human and Minority Rights Ministry, after the Ministry's intervention, the Roma in the Cukarica settlement were allowed to relocate their settlement several hundred meters away from the original site. In the Betonjerka settlement in Belgrade, 29 families (approximately 175 people) were forced to move when the land on which the settlement was located was transferred to an investor. Municipal authorities, in cooperation with the NGO Children's Roma Center, provided alternate housing for the families in several different locations; 13 of the families accepted offers of housing in a building that reportedly had an asbestos problem. Minister Ljajic blocked demolition of a separate settlement in an industrial zone during the year. In July, a Roma family of eight, including an infant, was left homeless when the building residents' committee evicted them from their apartment after it received control of the building from the Stari Grad Municipality.

The Belgrade Municipal Assembly adopted a plan to construct 58 small settlements for socially vulnerable persons, with the objective of resettling some of the Roma from illegal settlements. The Belgrade Municipal Government has obtained the bulk of the funds for the $15,625,000 (853,750,000 dinars) project, which generated societal resentment due to the perception that Roma were being favored over other homeless populations. The Belgrade Government halted construction of one such settlement after a demonstration by neighbors of the site; the case was in court at year's end. The housing situation for Roma is expected to be aggravated by the return of approximately 50,000 Roma to Serbia, most originally from Kosovo, who were being deported from Germany and Switzerland under bilateral readmission agreements.

In Leskovac and the town of Pozega, Roma reportedly have been refused social welfare services for arbitrary reasons. Roma IDPs from Kosovo were particularly subject to discrimination and abuse; most of them lacked identity documents, making it difficult for them to gain access to social services and state-provided health care. The Roma Educational Center reported that some Roma IDPs in Nis were mistaken for Kosovo Albanians and subjected to discrimination on that basis.
Some non-Roma refugees and IDPs suffered from discrimination. The HLC reported that the Government did not allow some Kosovo IDPs to redesignate their official places of residence as Kragujevac; this deprived them of health insurance, social welfare, and normal access to schools. The Nis Council for Human Rights reported that the approximately 20,000 refugees and IDPs in the Nis area suffered from "quiet discrimination" in areas such as housing and employment.

Roma education remained a problem, and lack of official documents hindered Roma's ability to receive services available to all other citizens. The UNHCR, with government support, began health education programs for Roma, and catch-up and head-start programs for Roma children. The SaM Government put an emphasis on increasing enrollment of Roma children in school; in November, the SaM Human and Minority Rights Ministry provided scholarships to high-achieving Roma middle school students. During the year, there were 42 Roma children in secondary schools and 41 Roma in universities, compared to 52 for the "history of Yugoslavia," according to SaM Federal Minorities and Human Rights Minister Rasim Ljajic. During the year, the Serbian Government provided scholarships to the Roma university students.

Ethnic Albanian leaders of the southern Serbian municipalities of Presevo, Bujanovac, and Medvedja continued to complain of the under representation of ethnic Albanians in state structures (see Section 3). Implementation of the Covic plan gave southern Serbia's ethnic Albanians proportional representation in the police and control of local governments in municipalities where they constituted a majority. There were no Albanians enrolled in Serbian universities during the year; applicants for the affirmative action program were required to take (not pass) the entrance exam, but none did so because they did not speak Serbian.

Minister Ljajic, a Bosniak, was one of the more visible and influential members of the SaM Government during the year. Bosniaks led local governments in the three majority-Muslim municipalities in the Sandzak region. In Novi Pazar, the municipal government in 2002 gave the Bosnian language official status, as allowed under the Serbian Law on Local Self-Government. All seven Sandzak municipalities--Novi Pazar, Tutin, Sjenica, Pribor, Prijepolje, and Nova Varos–-had multi-ethnic municipal assemblies.

Incitement to Acts of Discrimination

Although SaM and Serbian law provide for freedom of the press, political pressure from various factions restricted the independence of the media (see Section 2.a.). In April, Parliament approved the Public Information Law, which bans dissemination of information that incites violence, hatred, or discrimination (see Section 2.a.). Propaganda against "sects" (religions other than the seven "traditional" religions) continued in the press, and religious leaders noted that instances of vandalism often occurred soon after such press reports. According to some sources, the situation was further complicated because one of Serbia's leading experts on sects was a police captain whose works were used in military and police academies. Jewish leaders reported an increase in anti-Semitism in the media. Anti-Semitic hate speech often appeared in small-circulation books (see Section 2.c.).

Section 6 Worker Rights

a. The Right of Association

The law provides for the right of association; all workers, except military and police personnel, have the legal right to join or form unions, and workers did so in practice. In the socially owned state sector, 60 to 70 percent of workers belonged to unions. In the private sector, only 4 to 6 percent were unionized, and in agriculture up to 3 percent. The Alliance of Independent Labor Unions (Savez Samostalnih Sindikata Srbije, or SSSS), formerly affiliated with Milosevic's regime, claimed 1.8 million members, although this number was estimated to be closer to 800,000 in practice. The largest independent union was the United Branch Independent Labor Unions (Nezavisnost), which had approximately 600,000 members. The third largest union was the Association of Free and Independent Trade Unions (ASNS), which had approximately 300,000 members; the ASNS is a member of the ruling coalition, and its leader is Minister of Labor in the Government. Most other independent unions were sector specific and had approximately 130,000 members. The largest among them is the union of the Electric Power Company of Serbia (EPS), with over 20,000 members.

The Criminal Code does not prohibit anti-union discrimination; the trade union Nezavisnost reported a number of cases in which its members were harassed either by employers or by representatives of other trade unions. The Labor Law guarantees freedom of trade union association and activities and stipulates that a trade union can be established without any approval and inscribed in the trade union register kept by the Labor Ministry.

The Social-Economic Council was established in August 2001 on the basis of a tripartite agreement among the Government, representative trade unions, and an employers' association; during the year, unions suspended participation in the Council, demanding that it be made a more representative Council (inclusion of additional ministries and employer associations) before they return.

Unions could affiliate internationally; however, only Nezavisnost was recognized by the international labor community as completely independent from the Government. Nezavisnost was a member of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) and other international unions.

b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively

The signing of collective agreements was not mandatory for employers, a situation which unions complained diminished their role in the system. A union must have 15 percent of employees as members to be eligible to negotiate with an employer, or 10 percent of all employees to negotiate with the Government.

Collective bargaining remained at a rudimentary level of development. Individual unions continued to be narrow in their aims and did not join with unions in other sectors to bargain for common purposes. The history of trade unionism in the country centered not on bargaining for the collective needs of all workers but rather for the specific needs of a given group of workers. Thus, coal workers, teachers, health workers, and electric power industry employees have been ineffective in finding common denominators (for example, job security protection, minimum safety standards, or universal workers' benefits) on which to negotiate. This highly fragmented labor structure resulted in few improvements in wages or working conditions.

The law provides for the right to strike; however, during the State of Emergency, all strikes, protests, and public gatherings were forbidden. The Law on Strikes restricted the right to strike for employees in "essential service production enterprises," such as education, electric power, and postal services--approximately 50 percent of all employees. These employees must announce their strikes at least 15 days in advance and must ensure that a "minimum level of work" is provided. Security forces did not disrupt any strikes or arrest union leaders during the year.

The independent unions, while active in recruiting new members, did not reach the size needed to mount Republic-wide strikes; however, unions held several strikes during the year. In January, between 4,000 and 5,000 workers of a copper mining and processing company (RTB Bor) protested in their factory and on the streets of Bor, requesting unpaid salaries, better working conditions, and new management capable of providing new contracts. The protest lasted 1 week and was resolved with the visit of Prime Minister Djindjic and Finance Minister Djelic, who showed respect for workers' requests and promised full assistance. Outstanding salaries were paid from the Republic budget and by the company, but sustainable functioning of the company remained a problem. In March, Customs officers, legally restricted from striking, twice stepped up inspections at border crossings, creating 6-kilometer lines at the border to protest for higher wages. The Customs officers' work actions were intended to put pressure on their new superiors in the Government during the transition of services from the federal to republican level. The Government did not agree to the demands, but Finance Minister Djelic managed to moderate the protest.

During the summer, there were a number of major protests. Employees of several republican institutions protested--including employees from some former federal bodies that devolved to the republic level--mostly seeking higher salaries.

The EPS union launched the biggest protest of the summer by withholding certain services from the public; the protest escalated to a 4-day blockade of a major thoroughfare in front of the Parliament, and ended with an agreement between union leaders and the Ministry of Energy.

In August, farmers, farm unions, and some workers caused traffic chaos in several parts of Serbia by blocking roads in protest over various issues, ranging from privatization to overdue crop payments. At the same time, workers of a small agricultural company in Erdevik, in Serbia's northern province of Vojvodina, repeatedly blocked the main highway with tractors and trucks to protest the way the company was privatized.

Public workers, including teachers, health workers, and court assistants, held strikes during the year to seek job security, higher pay, and the regular payment of wages. In general, job security fears due to high unemployment, along with disorganization of private sector trade unions, limited workers' willingness to strike.

There are no export processing zones.

c. Prohibition of Forced or Bonded Labor

The law prohibits forced and bonded labor, including by children; however, there were reports that such practices occurred (see Sections 6.d. and 6.f.).

d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for Employment

The minimum age for employment is 16 years, although in villages and farming communities it was common to find younger children at work assisting their families. Children--particularly Roma--also could be found in a variety of unofficial retail jobs, typically washing car windows or selling small items such as newspapers; however, in recent years, this type of labor has been less widespread because adults, lacking other options for employment, have taken many of these jobs. Roma children were often forced by their families into manual labor, compelled to beg, or trafficked abroad to work in begging or theft rings (see Section 6.f.). The Labor Ministry's Labor Inspectorate checked for child labor during its inspections, and the Social Welfare Ministry included prevention of child labor in its regular child and family protection programs.

In January, the SaM Parliament ratified the ILO Convention 182 on the Worst Forms of Child Labor.

e. Acceptable Conditions of Work

Large government enterprises, including all the major banks and industrial and trading companies, generally observed the minimum wage standard of approximately $75 (4,400 dinars) per month. This figure was roughly comparable to unemployment benefits and, at least theoretically, was paid to workers who had been placed in mandatory leave status. The minimum wage was insufficient to provide a decent standard of living for a worker and family. For example, the cost of food and utilities for a family of four was estimated to be $200 (12,000 dinars) per month. Private enterprises used the minimum wage as a guide, but tended to pay slightly more than the minimum wage.

Reports of sweatshops operating in the country were rare, although some privately owned textile factories operated under very poor conditions. According to Nezavisnost member Ranislav Canak, most of these factories were located in private houses in rural parts of Sandzak, making detection and enforcement difficult.

The official workweek of 40 hours was generally respected in state-owned enterprises but not in privately owned companies. According to the Labor Law, an employee may not work overtime for more than 4 hours in 1 day or for more than 240 hours within 1 calendar year. Payment of overtime was regulated by collective agreements.

In February, the Labor Ministry reorganized the Labor Inspection Department and announced openings for 500 new inspectors. It was mandatory for each company to establish a Safety and Security Unit in charge of implementing safety and security regulations; however, in practice, these units were often focused on rudimentary aspects of safety, such as purchase of soaps and detergents, rather than on providing safety equipment for workers. By some estimates, there were 20,000 workplace injuries annually in Serbia, with approximately 100 fatalities. Because of the competition for employment and the high degree of government control over the economy, workers who left hazardous work situations risked unemployment.

f. Trafficking in Persons

The law prohibits trafficking in persons; however, trafficking in persons remained a problem. On April 11, the criminal code was amended to include trafficking in persons as a criminal offense. Previously, authorities used laws against kidnapping, slavery, smuggling, and mediating prostitution to apprehend traffickers. The penalty for the new offense of trafficking is imprisonment of 1 to 10 years for a single offense, 3 to 40 years for multiple offenses, and 5 to 40 years if a minor is involved or if a victim is killed.

The Government reported having arrested an estimated 30 persons running trafficking operations during the year, almost all during the State of Emergency. No cases brought under the new trafficking law had reached trial phase by October 1; however, convictions were obtained on related charges during the year. Police officers were instructed how to distinguish trafficking victims from prostitutes and illegal migrants, and when police believed that a possible trafficking victim had arrived at the detention center for foreigners, they summoned the International Organization for Migration (IOM) to make a formal identification. The Government reported that 200 police officers had received anti-trafficking in persons training, which has been incorporated into the regular syllabus for officers. Police assisted in international investigations of human trafficking.

The country served as a transit country, and to a lesser extent a country of origin and a destination country, for trafficking in women and girls for the purpose of sexual exploitation. Serbia was primarily a transit country for internationally trafficked women going to Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Western Europe. The primary source countries for trafficking in persons were Moldova, Romania, Ukraine, Russia, and Bulgaria. In 2002, the IOM estimated that between 6,000 and 7,000 women were trafficked through Serbia. Since January, the IOM has seen far fewer trafficked women in Serbia, but it is not clear to what extent this trend reflected a decline in trafficking and to what extent it was due to other factors, such as better concealment after regional anti-trafficking operations in 2002. No reliable estimate existed on the number of women controlled by human traffickers in the country. Serbia did not traditionally serve as a major source country for trafficked women, but poor economic conditions have increased Serbian women's vulnerability to traffickers, particularly for Roma. Trafficking in children for use in begging or in theft rings was a problem among Roma.

Recruitment devices included advertisements for escort services, marriage offers, and offers of employment. Often women knowingly went to work as prostitutes and later, once they left their country of origin and were in the hands of traffickers, discovered that they were prisoners. There was anecdotal evidence that after anti-trafficking operations in 2002 some traffickers began treating trafficked women slightly better, providing a small amount of money and permitting some freedom of movement and contact with family. Women were recruited, transported, sold, and controlled by international organized crime networks. The central point in Serbia for holding and transferring trafficked women was Belgrade.

There were no reports of government officials condoning or participating in trafficking in Serbia, but trafficking in Serbia could not take place without the cooperation of at least some police, border guards, and minor officials. No police, including border guards, were arrested for facilitating trafficking during the year; however, in 2002, 12 police officers who were providing security at venues where trafficked women were present were arrested during raids. Criminal charges were filed against one of the officers, and the others were fined, suspended, or fired.

With the dissolution of the FRY, the position of Anti-Trafficking Coordinator moved from the federal level to the republic level and was held by the Deputy Head of the Department of Border Police. The Coordinator leads a multidisciplinary anti-trafficking team, which included many Serbian Government ministries (MUP, Social Welfare, Health, Justice, Labor, Finance), the IOM, the OSCE, and two local NGO's--Astra, which was dedicated exclusively to the fight against trafficking and ran a trafficking victim's hotline and carried out extensive public awareness campaigns to prevent trafficking, and the Counseling Center Against Family Violence, which ran a shelter for trafficking victims. NGOs and volunteers provided legal, medical, psychological, and other assistance to victims. The IOM managed repatriation of victims and repatriated 36 women determined to be victims of trafficking during the year. The IOM also assisted in the reintegration of 10 local victims during the year. In 2002, the IOM opened a regional clearing center for information on trafficking victims, which operated in Government-donated offices in Belgrade. An anti-trafficking police team was established for each police district.

KOSOVO
Kosovo is administered under the civil authority of the U.N. Interim Administrative Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), pursuant to U.N. Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1244. UNMIK and its chief administrator, the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG), established a civil administration in 1999, following the conclusion of the NATO military campaign that forced the withdrawal of Yugoslav and Serb forces. In 2001, UNMIK promulgated the Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government in Kosovo (the Constitutional Framework), which defined the Provisional Institutions of Self Government (PISG). The PISG is made up of the 120-member Kosovo Assembly, which in 2002 selected Ibrahim Rugova as President of Kosovo and Bajram Rexhepi as Prime Minister, as well as other government officials. Kosovo has a multi-party system with three dominant mono-ethnic Albanian parties and several minority parties and coalitions. In 2002, municipal elections were held which were well organized, peaceful, and met international standards.

UNMIK has issued regulations to address the civil and legal responsibilities of governmental entities and private individuals, and promulgated laws passed by the Kosovo Assembly. UNMIK regulations bind all public officials, including judges, to respect international human rights law. The Constitutional Framework provides for an independent judiciary; however, both the international and local judiciary continued to be, at times, subjected to bias and outside influence, particularly in inter-ethnic cases.

The U.N.-authorized, NATO-led peacekeeping force for Kosovo, known as the Kosovo Force or KFOR, continued to carry out its mandate to maintain internal security and defend against external threats. Policing was done by UNMIK Civilian Police (CIVPOL), which continued to transfer basic police authority and functions to the Kosovo Police Service (KPS), while maintaining oversight. The Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC), a civilian emergency preparedness service agency that incorporated disarmed former fighters of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), continued to train and develop its disaster response skills, and undertook humanitarian projects. While the UNMIK international civilian authorities and KFOR generally maintained effective control over security forces, there were instances in which elements of the security forces acted independently of their respective authority. Some members of security forces committed human rights abuses.
The economy, in transition from a centrally directed to a market-based economy, was based primarily on agriculture, mining industries, and construction services, with a heavy dependence on foreign remittances. Kosovo had an estimated population of 1.7 million. Gross domestic product grew by 2 percent during the year and almost 60 percent since 2000. Major industries had not reopened and the economy remained stagnant; UNMIK began a privatization program that experienced setbacks during the year. There was significant criminal economic activity. Unemployment estimates ranged from 50 to 60 percent among ethnic Albanians and higher among Kosovo Serbs and other ethnic communities.

UNMIK and the PISG generally respected the human rights of Kosovo's residents; however, there were serious problems in some areas. Several killings resulted from attacks that appeared to be politically motivated. There were some deaths and injuries resulting from landmines and particularly unexploded ordnance, but fewer than in previous years. There were some kidnappings. UNMIK's efforts to continue exhumation of gravesites and to pursue identification of remains improved during the year. There were allegations that KFOR and CIVPOL, at times, used excessive force. Twelve KPC members were suspended after an UNMIK-KFOR investigation found that they materially supported criminal activities. Lengthy pretrial detention was a problem; it continued to be used routinely in criminal cases, although the measure was intended to be used only in extraordinary circumstances. The judiciary did not always provide due process.

Media organizations criticized UNMIK regulations prohibiting articles that might encourage criminal activity or violence as an infringement on freedom of speech and of the press. UNMIK occasionally limited freedom of assembly and forcibly disrupted some violent demonstrations. Religious and ethnic tensions and violence persisted. Freedom of movement for ethnic minorities, particularly Kosovo Serbs, continued to be a serious problem; many of the approximately 100,000 Kosovo Serbs who remained in Kosovo continued to live in the north or in enclaves under the protection of KFOR. Of the more than 225,000 members of ethnic communities (including approximately 170,000 Kosovo Serbs and 25,000 Roma) displaced after June 1999, few returned to Kosovo due to concerns about security, freedom of movement, and lack of employment opportunities. Despite this, efforts to facilitate internally displaced person (IDP) returns improved during the year. Some international agencies and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) continued to organize small-scale return projects.

Violence and discrimination against women remained serious problems. Persons with mental and physical disabilities faced considerable social discrimination and lacked access to adequate social and health services, despite some efforts to improve facilities and security. The level of violence against Kosovo Serbs remained largely constant with several prominent and brutal incidents receiving widespread attention. None of the perpetrators of Serb killings with a presumed ethnic motivation were arrested during the year, causing considerable concern within the Serb community. Child labor increased as more poor rural families moved to cities. Trafficking in persons, particularly women for forced prostitution, remained a serious problem.

RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person:
a. Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life

There were no reports of the arbitrary or unlawful deprivation of life committed by UNMIK, the PISG, KFOR, or their agents.

On February 1, Pristina District Court sentenced an UNMIK police officer, John Atanga, to 1 year in prison for negligent homicide after running over two persons with his vehicle in 1999.

During the year, police recorded 72 killings; 2 more than in 2002 (see Section 5). Some killings may have been politically motivated, particularly because some of the victims were either political party officials or connected with high-profile political activity; however, such cases significantly decreased from 2002.

On August 19, UNMIK CIVPOL officer, Satish Menon, was killed when a sniper fired on his vehicle with an automatic weapon. The case remained unsolved at year's end. On September 9, KPS officer, Hajdar Ahmeti, was killed in an ambush by unknown persons while returning home from duty near Erenik river. Police conducted a raid at a residence of the village of Berjahe, Gjakova and arrested three suspects for Ahmeti's murder; however, the trial had not begun at year's end. On September 10, an attempt to kill KPS serious crimes investigator, Fadil Syleviqi, failed; however, his associate, Agim Makolli, was killed in the ambush. Syleviqi testified on June 17 in the trial of Rrustem Mustafa, or "Commander Rremi," that resulted in the war crimes convictions and sentencing of a total of 45 years of imprisonment for four former KLA members, including Mustafa, who was also a former KPC zone commander (see Section 1.e.). On November 24, unknown assailants killed two KPS members, Sebahate Tolaj and Isuf Haklaj, of the Peje/Pec Regional Serious Crimes Unit while driving to work; both were subordinates of Tahir Zemaj during the war, and were officially investigating Zemaj's case.

Several witnesses in high profile cases were killed or attacked during the year, underscoring the lack of an adequate witness protection program. Two witnesses in the Dukagjini group case were killed, Tahir Zemaj on Janury 4 and Ilir Selimaj on April 14. Additionally, several witnesses survived attempted killings, including Dukagjini group witness Ramiz Muriqi, and KPS member and Rremi group witness Fadil Sylevic. It was widely speculated that several KPS officers were murdered as a result of their investigative work in some unsolved high profile crimes, including KPS officer Hajdar Ahmeti on September 7, and two KPS officers from Peja Regional Serious Crimes Unit, Isuf Haklaj and Sabahate Tolaj, on November 24.

On March 24, the 2002 trial of former KLA officer Sali Veseli and three other suspects for the 2000 murder of former KLA commander Ekrem Rexha, known as "Commander Drini," concluded. The court found Sali Veseli guilty of inciting the murder and sentenced him to 10 years' imprisonment; the court sentenced, Xhemajl Beqiraj to 1 year in prison, Halil Cadraku to 2 years and 6 months in prison for possession of arms without permission, and released Abit Haziraj.

Following the 2002 convictions of five former senior members of the KLA, two key witnesses in their trial were killed in two separate incidents. Tahir Zemaj, a former commander of the now-defunct guerilla army and KLA rival Armed Forces of the Republic of Kosovo (FARK), his son and his nephew were killed on January 4. Ilir Selimaj, a former member of the defendant's KLA unit, and his pregnant sister-in-law were killed on April 14.

No arrests were made by year's end for the 2002 killing of Smajl Hajdaraj, an LDK member of the Kosovo Assembly. In the 2002 killing of Uke Bytyci, LDK Mayor of Suhareke/Suva Reka municipality, in which his two bodyguards, Bajram Bytyci and Bahtir Bajrami were also shot, the Court of Prizren found Jetullah Kryeziu guilty and sentenced him to 20 years and 6 months in prison; the court sentenced Mentor Kryeziu to 5 months in prison for hiding the weapon. By year's end, no charges had been filed against the several suspects that were arrested in 2002 for the 2001 killing of Bekim Kastrati, a journalist with the LDK-linked newspaper, Bota Sot, and LDK bodyguard Besim Dajaku.

There were no developments in several murders from previous years, including the following from 2001: The murder of Ismet Rraci, LDK branch president and president of Kline/Klina Municipal Assembly; the killing of Ahmet Balaj, an LDK committee member in Mitrovica; the killing of Qerim Ismaili of the Kosovo Democratic Initiative; and the shooting of two brothers, one of whom was a bodyguard of the mayor of Istog/Istok municipality.

There were a number of assaults and killings of ethnic Serbs during the year, including those perpetrated by other Serbs (see Section 5).

Land mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) from the 1999 conflict remained a problem, particularly in rural areas; ho