Preface

Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - 2005
Released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor
March 8, 2006

All men and women desire and deserve to live in dignity and liberty. As President Bush said: "The advance of freedom is the great story of our time." Promoting human rights and democracy is a worldwide phenomenon and there is a growing global discussion of democracy and the universal values protected by democratic governance.

The increasing demand for democratic governance reflects recognition that the best guarantor of human rights is a thriving democracy with representative, accountable institutions of government, equal rights under the rule of law, a robust civil society, political pluralism, and independent media.

The United States and other free nations have a duty to defend human rights and help spread democracy’s blessings. We must help countries develop the democratic institutions that will ensure human rights are respected over the long term. We must help fragile democracies deliver a better life for their citizens. We must call countries to account when they retreat from their international human rights commitments. And we must always stand in solidarity with the courageous men and women across the globe who live in fear yet dream of freedom.

By defending and advancing human rights and democratic principles, we keep faith with our country’s most cherished values and lay the foundation for lasting peace. Fulfilling the promise of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights and building vibrant democracies worldwide will take generations, but it is work of the utmost urgency that cannot be delayed.

With these thoughts in mind, I am pleased to transmit the Department of State’s Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2005 to the United States Congress.

Condoleezza Rice
Secretary of State

Introduction

Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - 2005
Released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor
March 8, 2006

These reports describe the performance of 196 countries in putting into practice their international commitments on human rights. These basic rights, reflected in the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, have been embraced by people of every culture and color, every background and belief, and constitute what President Bush calls the "non-negotiable demands of human dignity."

The Department of State published the first annual country reports on human rights practices in 1977 in accordance with congressional mandate, and they have become an essential element of the United States’ effort to promote respect for human rights worldwide. For nearly three decades, the reports have served as a reference document and a foundation for cooperative action among governments, organizations, and individuals seeking to end abuses and strengthen the capacity of countries to protect the fundamental rights of all.

The worldwide championing of human rights is not an attempt to impose alien values on citizens of other countries or to interfere in their internal affairs. The Universal Declaration calls upon "every individual and every organ of society … to promote respect for these rights and freedoms and by progressive measures, national and international, to secure their universal and effective recognition and observance…"

President Bush has committed the United States to working with other democracies and men and women of goodwill across the globe to reach an historic long-term goal: "the end of tyranny in our world."

To be sure, violations of human rights and miscarriages of justice can and do occur in democratic countries. No governmental system is without flaws. Human rights conditions in democracies across the globe vary widely, and these country reports reflect that fact. In particular, democratic systems with shallow roots and scarce resources can fall far short of meeting their solemn commitments to citizens, including human rights commitments. Democratic transitions can be tumultuous and wrenching. Rampant corruption can retard democratic development, distort judicial processes, and destroy public trust. Nonetheless, taken overall, countries with democratic systems provide far greater protections against violations of human rights than do nondemocratic states.

The United States’ own journey toward liberty and justice for all has been long and difficult, and it is still far from complete. Yet over time our independent branches of government, our free media, our openness to the world, and, most importantly, the civic courage of impatient American patriots help us keep faith with our founding ideals and our international human rights obligations.

These country reports offer a factual basis by which to assess the progress made on human rights and the challenges that remain. The reports review each country’s performance in 2005, not one country’s performance against that of another. While each country report speaks for itself, cross-cutting observations can be made. Six broad observations, supported by country-specific examples, are highlighted below. The examples are illustrative, not exhaustive.

First, countries in which power is concentrated in the hands of unaccountable rulers tend to be the world’s most systematic human rights violators. These states range from closed, totalitarian systems that subject their citizens to a wholesale deprivation of their basic rights to authoritarian systems in which the exercise of basic rights is severely restricted.

In 2005 the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) remained one of the world’s most isolated countries. The systematically repressive regime continued to control almost all aspects of citizens' lives, denying freedoms of speech, religion, the press, assembly, association, and movement, as well as workers’ rights. In December 2005, the regime further receded into isolation by calling for significant drawdowns of the international nongovernmental organization (NGO) presence in the country.

In Burma where a junta rules by diktat, promises of democratic reform and respect for human rights continued to serve as a façade for brutality and repression. Forced labor, trafficking in persons, use of child soldiers, and religious discrimination remained serious concerns. The military’s continuing abuses included systematic use of rape, torture, execution, and forced relocation of citizens belonging to ethnic minorities. The regime maintained iron-fisted control through the surveillance, harassment, and imprisonment of political activists, including Nobel Laureate and opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi, who remained under house arrest without charge.

In 2005 the Iranian government’s already poor record on human rights and democracy worsened. In the June presidential elections, slightly more than a thousand registered candidates – including all the female candidates – were arbitrarily thrown out of contention by the country’s guardian council. The newly elected hard-line president denied the Holocaust occurred and called for the elimination of Israel. The ruling clerics and the president oversaw deterioration in prison conditions for the hundreds of political prisoners, further restrictions on press freedom, and a continuing rollback of social and political freedoms. Serious abuses such as summary executions, severe violations of religious freedom, discrimination based on ethnicity and religion, disappearances, extremist vigilantism, and use of torture and other degrading treatment continued.

In Zimbabwe the government maintained a steady assault on human dignity and basic freedoms, tightening its hold on civil society and human rights NGOs and manipulating the March parliamentary elections. Opposition members were subjected to abuse, including torture and rape. New constitutional amendments allowed the government to restrict exit from the country, transferred title to the government of all land reassigned in the land acquisition program, and removed the right to challenge land acquisitions in court. The government’s Operation Restore Order, initiated to demolish allegedly illegal housing and businesses, displaced or destroyed the livelihoods of more than 700 thousand persons and further strained the country’s weak and depressed economy.

In Cuba the regime continued to control all aspects of life through the communist party and state-controlled mass organizations. The regime suppressed calls for democratic reform, such as the Varela Project, which proposed a national referendum. Authorities arrested, detained, fined, and threatened Varela activists and the government held at least 333 political prisoners and detainees.

China's human rights record remained poor, and the government continued to commit serious abuses. Those who publicly advocated against Chinese government policies or views or protested against government authority faced harassment, detention, and imprisonment by government and security authorities. Disturbances of public order and protests calling for redress of grievances increased significantly, and several incidents were violently suppressed. Key measures to increase the authority of the judiciary and reduce the arbitrary power of police and security forces stalled. Restrictions of the media and the Internet continued. Repression of minority groups continued unabated, particularly of Uighurs and Tibetans. New religious affairs regulations were adopted expanding legal protection for some activities of registered religious groups, but repression of unregistered religious groups continued, as did repression of the Falun Gong spiritual movement.

In Belarus President Lukashenko continued to arrogate all power to himself and his dictatorial regime. Pro-democracy activists, including opposition politicians, independent trade union leaders, students, and newspaper editors, were detained, fined, and imprisoned for criticizing Lukashenko and his regime. His government increasingly used tax inspections and new registration requirements to complicate or deny NGOs, independent media, political parties, and minority and religious organizations the ability to operate legally.

Second, human rights and democracy are closely linked, and both are essential to long-term stability and security. Free and democratic nations that respect the rights of their citizens help to lay the foundation for lasting peace. In contrast, states that severely and systematically violate the human rights of their own people are likely to pose threats to neighboring countries and the international community.

Burma is a case in point. Only by Burma’s return to the democratic path from which it was wrenched can the basic rights of the Burmese people be realized. The junta refuses to recognize the results of the historic free and fair legislative elections in 1990. The regime’s cruel and destructive misrule has inflicted tremendous suffering on the Burmese people and caused or exacerbated a host of ills for its neighbors, from refugee outflows to the spread of infectious diseases and the trafficking of drugs and human beings. On December 16, the UN Security Council held a landmark discussion on the situation in Burma.

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is another example. When the Korean peninsula was divided, the DPRK and the Republic of Korea (ROK or South Korea) were at roughly the same economic point, and both were subject to authoritarian rule. Political and economic freedom has made the difference between the two Koreas. Today, North Koreans are deprived of the most basic freedoms, while the regime’s authoritarian rule produced tens of thousands of refugees. The government earned hard currency through illicit activities, including narcotics trafficking, counterfeiting of currency and goods such as cigarettes, and smuggling. Pyongyang has not heeded the international community’s repeated calls to dismantle its nuclear programs.

The Iranian government continued to ignore the desire of the Iranian people for responsible, accountable government, continuing its dangerous policies of pursuing a nuclear weapons capability, providing support to terrorist organizations, and advocating – including in several public speeches by the new president – the destruction of a UN member state. Iran’s deprivation of basic rights to its own people, its interference in Iraq, its support for Hizballah, Hamas, and other terrorist organizations, and its refusal to engage constructively on these issues, have further isolated it from the world community.

Similarly, the government of Syria refused international calls to respect the fundamental freedoms of its people and end its interference in the affairs of its neighbors. Syria continued to provide support for Hizballah, Hamas, and other Palestinian rejectionist groups and did not cooperate fully with the UN International Independent Investigative Commission on the assassination in Beirut of former Lebanese Prime Minister al-Hariri. The Chief Investigator’s reports concluded that evidence pointed to involvement by Syrian authorities and made it clear that Syrian officials, while purporting to cooperate, deliberately misled the investigators.

By contrast, in the Balkans, a marked overall improvement in human rights, democracy, and the rule of law over the past several years has led to greater stability and security in the region. Increasingly democratic governments are in place, more war criminals are facing justice, significant numbers of displaced persons have returned home, elections are progressively more compliant with international standards, and neighbors are deepening their cooperation to resolve post-conflict and regional problems. Many countries of the former Yugoslavia have made progress in bringing persons accused of war crimes to trial in domestic courts, which is important to national reconciliation and regional stability. At the end of 2005, however, two of the most wanted war crimes suspects, Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, remained at large.

Third, some of the most serious violations of human rights are committed by governments within the context of internal and/or cross-border armed conflicts. The Sudanese government’s 2003 attempt to quell a minor uprising of African rebels in Darfur by arming janjaweed militias and allowing them to ravage the region resulted in a vicious conflict. The Department of State in September of 2004 determined that genocide occurred in Darfur. It continued in 2005. By the end of 2005, at least 70 thousand civilians had perished, nearly 2 million had been displaced by the fighting, and more than 200 thousand refugees had fled into neighboring Chad. Torture was widespread and systematic in Darfur, as was violence against women, including rape used as a tool of war. There were reports of women being marched away into the desert; their fate remained unknown. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed by the Sudanese government and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement opened the way to adopt a constitution in July and form a government of national unity to serve until elections in 2009. The African Union deployed seven thousand troops to Darfur, where their presence helped curb some but not all of the violence. At the end of 2005, government-supported janjaweed attacks on civilians continued.

Nepal’s poor human rights record worsened. The government continued to commit many serious abuses, both during and after the February-April state of emergency that suspended all fundamental rights except for habeas corpus. In many cases the government disregarded habeas corpus orders issued by the Supreme Court and often rearrested student and political party leaders. The Maoist insurgents also continued their campaign of torturing, killing, bombing, conscripting children, kidnapping, extorting, and forcing closures of schools and businesses.

The political crisis in Cote d’Ivoire, which continued to divide the country, led to further abuses in 2005, including rape, torture, and extrajudicial killings committed by government and rebel security forces. There were fewer reports of rebel recruitment of child soldiers, and many were released. Violence and threats of violence against the political opposition continued. Despite continued efforts by the international community and the African Union, the political process to establish a power-sharing government remained stalled. By the end of September, little work had been completed to prepare for the scheduled October 30 elections, and disarmament of the New Forces rebel group had not begun. On October 6, the African Union decided to extend President Laurent Gbagbo’s term in office by up to one year.

In Chechnya and elsewhere in Russia’s Northern Caucasus region, federal forces and pro-Moscow Chechen forces engaged in abuses including torture, summary executions, disappearances, and arbitrary detentions. Pro-Moscow Chechen paramilitaries at times appeared to act independently of the Russian command structure, and there was been no indication that the federal authorities made any effective effort to rein them in or hold them accountable for egregious abuses. Antigovernment forces also continued to commit terrorist bombings and serious human rights abuses in the North Caucasus. The year 2005 saw the continued spread of violence and abuses throughout the region, where there was an overall climate of lawlessness and corruption.

The Great Lakes region of central Africa, encompassing the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Rwanda, Burundi, and Uganda, has been plagued by civil war, large-scale interethnic violence, and severe conflict-related human rights abuses for well over a decade. However, there was less violence overall in 2005, and the human rights situation improved markedly, encouraging tens of thousands of displaced persons, particularly Burundians, to return home. Burundi concluded its four-year transitional process, and there were historical electoral advances in the DRC. Governments in the Great Lakes region made significant progress in demobilizing thousands of child soldiers in their military forces and those belonging to various rebel groups. At the same time, various armed groups based in eastern Congo continued to destabilize the region and compete with one another for strategic and natural resources, despite UN-supported Congolese military operations to disband armed groups in the DRC. Thousands of rebels from Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi, including Rwandan rebels who led the 1994 Rwandan genocide, continued to oppose the government of their respective countries, attack civilians in the DRC, and commit numerous serious abuses, particularly against women and children. The governments of Rwanda and Uganda reportedly continued illegally to channel arms to armed groups operating and committing abuses in the eastern DRC.

In Colombia, human rights violations related to the 41-year internal armed conflict continued. However, the government’s concentrated military offensive against illegal armed groups and ongoing demobilization of paramilitary groups led to reductions in killings and kidnappings. Colombia also began a four-year process to implement a new adversarial accusatory-style criminal procedures code. However, impunity remained a major obstacle, particularly for officials accused of committing past human rights abuses, as well as for certain members of the military who collaborated with paramilitary groups.

Fourth, where civil society and independent media are under siege, fundamental freedoms of expression, association, and assembly are undermined. A robust civil society and independent media help create conditions under which human rights can flourish by raising awareness among publics about their rights, exposing abuses, pressing for reform, and holding governments accountable.

Governments should defend – not abuse – the peaceful exercise of fundamental freedoms by members of the media and civil society even if they do not agree with their views or actions. Restrictions that are imposed by law on the exercise of such freedoms can only be justified to the extent they are consistent with a country’s human rights obligations and are not merely a pretext for restricting such rights.

When states wield the law as a political weapon or an instrument of repression against civil society and the media, they rule by law rather than upholding the rule of law. The rule of law acts as a check on state power, i.e., it is a system designed to protect the human rights of the individual against the power of the state. In contrast, rule by law can be an abuse of power, i.e., the manipulation of the law and the judicial system to maintain the power of the rulers over the ruled.

In 2005, a disturbing number of countries across the globe passed or selectively applied laws against the media and NGOs. For example:

The Cambodian government utilized existing criminal defamation laws to intimidate, arrest, and prosecute critics and opposition members over the course of the year.

China increased restrictions on the media and the Internet, leading to two known arrests.

The Zimbabwean government arrested persons who criticized President Mugabe, harassed and arbitrarily detained journalists, closed an independent newspaper, forcibly dispersed demonstrators, and arrested and detained opposition leaders and their supporters.

In Venezuela new laws governing libel, defamation, and broadcast media content, coupled with legal harassment and physical intimidation, resulted in limitations on media freedoms and a climate of self-censorship. There continued to be reports that government representatives and supporters intimidated and threatened members of the political opposition, several human rights NGOs, and other civil society groups. Some NGOs also charged that the government used the judiciary to place limitations on the political opposition.

In Belarus the Lukashenko government stepped up its suppression of opposition groups and imposed new restrictions on civil society. There were politically motivated arrests, several independent newspapers were closed, the operations of others were hindered, and NGOs were harassed.

In Russia raids on NGO offices, registration problems, intimidation of NGO leaders and staff and visa problems for foreign NGO workers had a negative effect, as did the parliament’s adoption of a new restrictive law on NGOs. The Kremlin also acted to limit critical voices in the media. The government decreased the diversity of the broadcast media, particularly television, the main source of news for the majority of Russians. By the end of 2005, all independent nationwide television stations had been taken over either by the state or by state-friendly organizations.

Fifth, democratic elections by themselves do not ensure that human rights will be respected, but they can put a country on the path to reform and lay the groundwork for institutionalizing human rights protections. Democratic elections are, however, milestones on a long journey of democratization. They are essential to establishing accountable governments and governmental institutions that abide by the rule of law and are responsive to the needs of citizens.

In Iraq 2005 was a year of major progress for democracy, democratic rights and freedom. There was a steady growth of NGOs and other civil society associations that promote human rights. The January 30th legislative elections marked a tremendous step forward in solidifying governmental institutions to protect human rights and freedom in a country whose history is marred by some of the worst human rights abuses in the recent past. In an October 15 referendum and December 15 election, Iraqi voters adopted a permanent constitution and elected members of the country’s new legislature, the Council of Representatives, thus consolidating democratic institutions that can provide a framework for a democratic future. Although the historic elections and new institutions of democratic government provided a structure for real advances, civic life and the social fabric remained under intense strain from the widespread violence principally inflicted by insurgent and terrorist elements. Additionally, elements of sectarian militias and security forces frequently acted independently of government authority. Still, the government set and adhered to a legal and electoral course based on respect for political rights.

Although deprived of basic human rights for years, Afghans in 2005 continued to show their courage and commitment to a future of freedom and respect for human rights. September 18 marked the first parliamentary elections in nearly three decades. Women enthusiastically voted in the elections, which included 582 female candidates for office. Sixty-eight women were elected to the lower House in seats reserved for women under the 2004 Constitution. Seventeen of the 68 women would have been elected in their own right even without the set-aside seats. In the upper House, 17 of the 34 seats appointed by the president were reserved for women; the Provincial Councils elected an additional 5 women for a total of 22 women. The September 18 parliamentary elections occurred against the backdrop of a government still struggling to expand its authority over provincial centers, due to continued insecurity and violent resistance in some quarters.

In Ukraine there were notable improvements in human rights performance following the Orange Revolution, which led to the election of a new government reflecting the will of the people. In 2005 there was increased accountability by police officers, and the mass media made gains in independence. Interference with freedom of assembly largely ceased, and most limitations on freedom of association were lifted. A wide variety of domestic and international human rights groups also generally operated without government harassment.

Indonesia, the world’s most populous Muslim majority country, made significant progress in strengthening the architecture of its democratic system. Through a series of historic local elections, Indonesians were able directly to elect their leaders at the city, regency, and provincial levels for the first time. There were improvements in the human rights situation, although significant problems remained, and serious violations continued. A critical development was the landmark August 15 peace agreement with the Free Aceh Movement ending decades of armed conflict. The government also inaugurated the Papuan People's Assembly and took other steps toward fulfilling the 2001 Special Autonomy Law on Papua.

Lebanon made significant progress in ending the 29-year Syrian military occupation and regaining sovereignty under a democratically elected parliament. However, continuing Syrian influence remained a problem.

Liberia emerged into the international democratic arena with its dramatic step away from a violent past and toward a free and democratic future. On November 23, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf was declared the winner of multiparty presidential elections, making her Africa’s first elected female head of state and marking a milestone in the country's transition from civil war to democracy. The transitional government generally respected the human rights of its citizens and passed legislation to strengthen human rights. However, police abuse, official corruption, and other problems persisted and were exacerbated by the legacy of the 14-year civil war, including severely damaged infrastructure and widespread poverty and unemployment.

Sixth, progress on democratic reform and human rights is neither linear nor guaranteed. Some states still have weak institutions of democratic government and continue to struggle; others have yet to fully commit to the democratic process. Steps forward can be marred with irregularities. There can be serious setbacks. Democratically elected governments do not always govern democratically once in power.

In 2005, many countries that have committed themselves to democratic reform showed mixed progress; some regressed.

The Kyrgyz Republic’s human rights record improved considerably following the change in leadership between March and July, although problems remained. President Akayev fled the country after opposition demonstrators took over the main government building in the capital to protest flawed elections. The July presidential election and November parliamentary election constituted improvements in some areas over previous elections. However, constitutional reform stalled and corruption remained a serious problem.

In Ecuador, congress removed democratically elected President Lucio Gutierrez in April following large scale protests and public withdrawal of support by the military and the national police leadership. Vice President Alfredo Palacio succeeded Gutierrez, and elections were scheduled for 2006.

Although the transitional government of the Democratic Republic of Congo postponed national general elections until 2006, the country held its first democratic national poll in 40 years. Voters overwhelmingly approved a new constitution in a largely free and fair national referendum, despite some irregularities.

In June, the Ugandan parliament approved a controversial amendment to eliminate presidential term limits, clearing the way for President Museveni to seek a third term. However, citizens voted in a national referendum to adopt a multiparty system of government, and the parliament amended the electoral laws to include opposition party participation in elections and in government.

The Egyptian government amended its constitution to provide for the country’s first multiparty presidential election in September. Ten political parties fielded candidates, and the campaign period was marked by vigorous public debate and greater political awareness and engagement. Voter turnout was low, however, and there were credible reports of widespread fraud during balloting. Presidential runner-up Ayman Nour, his parliamentary immunity stripped away in January, was sentenced in December on forgery charges to five years’ imprisonment after a six-month trial that failed to meet basic international standards. The November and December parliamentary elections witnessed significant gains by candidates affiliated with the outlawed Muslim Brotherhood. These elections were marred by excessive use of force by security forces, low turnout, and vote-rigging. The government refused to admit international observers for either the presidential or parliamentary elections. The National Council for Human Rights, established by the Egyptian parliament, issued its first annual report, frankly describing government abuses.

During the Ethiopian parliamentary elections in May, international observers noted numerous irregularities and voter intimidation. Scores of demonstrators protesting the elections were killed by security forces. Authorities detained, beat, and killed opposition members, NGO workers, ethnic minorities, and members of the press.

Azerbaijan’s November parliamentary elections, while an improvement in some areas, failed to meet a number of international standards. There were numerous credible reports of local officials interfering with the campaign process and misusing state resources, limited freedom of assembly, disproportionate use of force by police to disrupt rallies, and fraud and major irregularities in vote counting and tabulation. Thus far, additional actions taken during the postelection grievance process have not fully addressed the shortcomings of the electoral process.

Kazakhstan showed improvements in the pre-election period for the December presidential election, but overall it fell short of international standards for free and fair elections. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights noted serious limitations on political speech that prohibited certain kinds of criticism of the president, unequal access to the media for opposition and independent candidates, and violent disruptions of opposition campaign events. Legislation enacted during 2005, in particular the extremism law, national security amendments, and election law amendments, eroded legal protections for human rights and expanded the powers of the executive branch to regulate and control civil society and the media. But the Constitutional Court deemed unconstitutional a restrictive NGO law.

Uzbekistan’s human rights record, already poor, worsened considerably in 2005. A violent uprising in May in the city of Andijon led to disproportionate use of force by the authorities and a wave of repressive government actions that dominated the remainder of the year. The uprising started after a series of daily peaceful protests in support of businessmen on trial between February and May for Islamic extremism. On the night of May 12-13, unidentified individuals seized weapons from a police garrison, stormed the city prison where the defendants were being held, killed several guards, and released several hundred inmates, including the defendants. They then occupied the regional administration building and took hostages. On May 13, according to eyewitness accounts, government forces fired indiscriminately into a crowd that included unarmed civilians. resulting in hundreds of deaths. In the aftermath, the government harassed, beat, and jailed dozens of human rights activists, journalists, and others who spoke out about the events and sentenced numerous people to prison in trials that did not meet international standards. The government forced numerous domestic and international NGOs to close and severely restricted those that continued to operate.

In Russia, efforts continued to concentrate power in the Kremlin and direct democracy from the top down. To those ends, the Kremlin abolished direct elections of governors in favor of presidential nomination and legislative approval. In the current Russian context, where checks and balances are weak at best, this system limits government accountability to voters while further concentrating power in the executive branch. Amendments to the electoral and political party law amendments, billed as intended to strengthen nationwide political parties in the longer term, could in fact reduce the ability of opposition parties to compete in elections. This trend, taken together with continuing media restrictions, a compliant parliament, corruption and selectivity in enforcement of the law, political pressure on the judiciary, and harassment of some NGOs, resulted in an erosion of the accountability of government leaders to the people.

Pakistan’s human rights record continued to be poor, despite President Musharraf’s stated commitment to democratic transition and "enlightened moderation." Restrictions remained on freedom of movement, expression, association, and religion. Progress on democratization was limited. During elections for local governments in 2005, international and domestic observers found serious flaws, including interference by political parties, which affected the outcome of the vote in parts of the country. Police detained approximately 10 thousand Pakistan People’s Party activists in April prior to the arrival for a rally of Benazir Bhuto’s husband, Asif Ali Zardari. The security forces committed extrajudicial killings, violations of due process, arbitrary arrest, and torture. Corruption was pervasive throughout the government and police forces, and the government made little attempt to combat the problem. Security force officials who committed human rights abuses generally enjoyed de facto legal impunity.

Despite hard realities and high obstacles, there is an increasing worldwide demand for greater personal and political freedom and for the spread of democratic principles. For example, in the Broader Middle East and North Africa (BMENA) region, recent years have witnessed the beginnings of political pluralism, unprecedented elections, new protections for women and minorities, and indigenous calls for peaceful, democratic change.

At the November 2005 Forum for the Future held in Manama, Bahrain, 40 leaders representing civil society organizations from 16 BMENA countries participated alongside their foreign ministers. The civil society leaders outlined a set of priorities with a particular focus on rule of law, transparency, human rights, and women's empowerment. Among those serving on this civil society delegation were representatives from the Democracy Assistance Dialogue (DAD), who presented the outcomes of discussions and debates held over the course of the year between civil society leaders and their government counterparts on the critical topics of election reform and the development of legitimate political parties. The growing DAD network includes hundreds of civil society leaders from the BMENA region. To better support growing reform efforts in the region, a Foundation for the Future to provide support directly to civil society and a Fund for the Future to support investment in the region, were also launched at the Forum. The level and depth of civil society participation at the Forum for the Future was historic and positive and set an important precedent for genuine dialogue and partnership between civil society and governments on issues of political reform.

The Forum for the Future is just one of the many mechanisms through which the United States, other Group of 8 countries, and regional governments support the indigenous desire for reform in the broader Middle East and North Africa.

The growing worldwide demand for human rights and democracy reflected in these reports is not the result of the impersonal workings of some dialectic or of the orchestrations of foreign governments. Rather, this call derives from the powerful human desire to live in dignity and liberty and from the personal bravery and tenacity of men and women in every age and in every society who serve and sacrifice for the cause of freedom.

Serbia and Montenegro

Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - 2005
Released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor
March 8, 200

Serbia and Montenegro is a state union consisting of the relatively large Republic of Serbia and the much smaller Republic of Montenegro.* The state union is a parliamentary democracy. The state union government's responsibilities are limited to foreign affairs, national security, human and minority rights, and internal and external economic and commercial relations. The country has a population of 10.8 million** and is headed by President Svetozar Marovic, who was elected by parliament in 2003.

The Republic of Serbia is a parliamentary democracy with approximately 10.2 million inhabitants. Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica has led Serbia's multiparty government since March 2004. Boris Tadic was elected president in June 2004 elections that observers deemed essentially in line with international standards. While civilian authorities generally maintained effective control of the security forces, there were a few instances in which elements of the security forces acted independently of government authority.

The government generally respected the human rights of its citizens and continued efforts to address human rights violations; however, numerous problems from previous years persisted. The following human rights problems were reported:

• police violence, misconduct, and impunity
• arbitrary arrest and selective enforcement of the law for political purposes
• lengthy pretrial detention
• corruption in the judiciary
• lengthy trials of human rights cases
• government impediments to freedom of speech and the press
• harassment of journalists
• societal violence and discrimination against religious and ethnic minorities
• housing of internally displaced persons in inadequate conditions
• widespread government corruption
• harassment of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), particularly those involved in human rights
• two of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia's (ICTY) most wanted war crimes suspects, Ratko Mladic and Radovan Karadzic, remained at large
• violence against women and children
• trafficking in persons
  

The government's increased efforts in addressing human rights violations brought notable improvements. The government cooperated to a significant degree with the ICTY to turn over persons indicted for war crimes, potential witnesses, and documents; demonstrated that it could effectively prosecute high-profile crime cases in its domestic special courts; increased attention to human rights abuses of minorities; and implemented a witness protection program to help combat trafficking in persons.

RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom from:

a. Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life

The government or its agents did not commit any politically motivated killings; however, security forces killed two persons.

On January 7, members of the armed forces shot and killed a 16-year-old ethnic Albanian while he was trying to cross the country's border with Macedonia illegally. A Ministry of Defense investigation determined that the military acted in accordance with the law.

On October 21, a man died after being beaten by a police officer in Kikinda. Authorities charged officer Sasa Mijin in the Zrenjanin district court two days later and suspended a total of eight officers in connection with the case. Mijin was in custody and awaiting trial at year's end. Another officer, Tatjana Radisic, received a reduction in pay and was demoted.

Long-delayed trials for political killings from previous years continued during the year, some with notable progress.

At year's end the Belgrade special court for organized crime continued the trial of three dozen suspects in the 2003 assassination of prime minister Djindjic. Former secret police special operations unit (JSO) commander Milorad Ulemek was charged with organizing the assassination, former JSO deputy commander Zvezdan Jovanovic-Zveki was charged with murder, and 12 other persons were charged with organization and taking part in murder. Several others were charged with lesser crimes in connection with the assassination.

On July 18, the Belgrade special court for organized crime concluded its trial of Ulemek and others for the 2000 killing of former Serbian president Ivan Stambolic. The court sentenced Milorad Ulemek and 3 persons under his command to 40 years in prison, 2 others to 15 years in prison, and 1 person to 4 years in prison. The verdict named former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic, on trial before the ICTY, as the main instigator of the political assassination.

On June 29, a Belgrade district court concluded the retrial of Milorad Ulemek and 5 other former JSO members for the 1999 attempted killing of then Serbian Renewal Movement leader Vuk Draskovic. The court sentenced the 6 to 15 years in prison and also handed down prison sentences to a former intelligence chief and a former customs administration chief for their involvement.

The government had yet to complete its investigation into the disappearance and subsequent killing of Yili, Mehmet, and Agron Bytyqi, three US citizen brothers who were executed in Serbia in 1999. The bodies of the three were discovered in 2001 in a mass grave in rural Petrovo Selo, near a Serbian police facility. The bodies were found with their hands bound and gunshot wounds to their heads. At year's end there had been no indictments in the killings.

Domestic courts and the ICTY continued to try cases arising from crimes committed during the 1991-99 conflicts in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo (see sections 1.e. and 4).

Several military conscripts died during the year while on guard duty in remote areas, and their families challenged the military's determination that the deaths were suicides. During the year an official commission of inquiry rejected the military's finding that two soldiers who died in October 2004 while on guard duty in Topcider were victims of a homicide and suicide without third-party involvement. Authorities referred the case to the courts for resolution; however, no court action had been taken by year's end.

In July a demining expert was killed in an unexploded ordnance removal operation in Nis.

b. Disappearance

There were no reports of politically motivated disappearances.

During the year authorities failed to investigate human rights groups' allegations that, early in the year and subsequently in July, individuals belonging to the Security Information Agency threatened witnesses to the government's alleged involvement in incinerating bodies of Kosovar Albanians at the Mackatica plant in 1999. Authorities also did not investigate mass graves on Serbian Ministry of the Interior property that were discovered in 2001.

State union and Serbian authorities continued to cooperate with neighboring countries, the International Commission on Missing Persons, and other international organizations to identify missing persons and investigate graves discovered in Serbia. However, progress was slow, and at times the government showed an unwillingness to release information to the public. During the year authorities identified 560 bodies exhumed from mass graves dating to the Kosovo conflict and returned them to Kosovo. The government had not completed the identification and return of all the remains recovered by year's end. There were 2,494 missing persons cases that remained unsolved.

c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

The law prohibits such practices; however, police at times beat detainees and harassed persons, usually during arrest or initial detention for petty crimes.

The Belgrade-based Humanitarian Law Center (HLC) reported that, on February 16, police hit a 17-year-old girl in the stomach at a downtown Belgrade police station and handcuffed her to a radiator for several hours while detaining her for suspected theft. Authorities had not taken action on the report at year's end.

The Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia (HCS) reported that, on June 30, traffic police ordered a family to lie on the floor of their home in a village near Nis while the police hit and threatened to kill them. Police arrested the family and took them to a police station without informing them of their rights or the charges against them and continued to threaten and harass family members. Authorities had not taken action on the case at year's end, and the family reported continued police harassment.

HLC reported that, on July 5, police entered the apartment of a Belgrade man without authorization and beat the man and a friend. Police reportedly broke the door open, punched and kicked the men, then took them to the police station without informing them of any charges against them. Authorities had not taken action on the report by year's end.

On July 31, a lawyer for the Leskovac Committee for Human Rights reported that a police officer in Leskovac, Goran Velickovic, had beaten him. The lawyer had represented a client who was severely beaten by Velickovic in 2003. Authorities were investigating the case by year's end.

The Lawyers' Committee for Human Rights (YUCOM) reported that, on September 28, Novi Sad police officers beat a man during a train ride from Belgrade to Novi Sad, mistaking him for a rowdy football fan. YUCOM also received reports during the year of police using excessive force during football games and other sports events in Belgrade. The victims in these cases decided not to file charges against the officers.

Two court decisions during the year addressed past cases of police misconduct. In February the Vrbas municipal court ordered the Serbian government to pay approximately $3,700 (260 thousand dinars) to Dragan Sijacki for police abuse in 2000. In March the first municipal court in Belgrade ordered the Serbian government to pay approximately $14 thousand (1 million dinars) to the parents of the late Milan Ristic after an investigation found that police conduct was probably responsible for his death. The court found that authorities failed to conduct an expedient and comprehensive investigation into the cause of death and that they had hastily concluded that the death was a suicide.

There was no information on whether any further action was taken during the year in the following cases of alleged police misconduct: the prosecution, reported pending in 2004, of police officers Zoran Gogic and Dragan Bojanic for beating a man in Zrenjanin while on duty in January 2004 and the prosecution, reported pending in 2004, of three police officers for beating a man while in detention in 2003. A judge dismissed the private prosecution by the HLC, reported pending before an investigative judge in 2004, of officers in the Cacak police department for allegedly hitting and threatening a man in 2003 to force him to confess to a robbery.

Prison and Detention Center Conditions

Prison conditions generally met international standards; however, conditions varied greatly between facilities, and some guards abused prisoners.

In some prisons, most notably the Belgrade reformatory hospital housing psychiatric prisoners, inmates complained of dirty and inhumane conditions. The quality of food varied from poor to minimally acceptable, and health care was often inadequate. Guards were inadequately trained in the proper handling of prisoners. Juveniles were supposed to be held separately from adults; however, this did not always occur in practice.

The government permitted the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and local independent human rights monitors, including HCS, to visit prisons and to speak with prisoners without the presence of a warden.

d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention

The law prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention, and the government generally observed these prohibitions, with some high-profile exceptions.

Role of the Police and Security Apparatus

The approximately 43 thousand police officers in Serbia are part of the Ministry of the Interior. The police are divided into 33 regional secretariats that report to the republic government. The armed forces are under the control of the state union government and are responsible for national security. During the year responsibilities for border security were formally transferred to the Ministry of the Interior; however, in practice there has been no hand over of border post responsibilities from the military to the interior ministry, and military personnel still perform these functions.

The effectiveness of the police was uneven and generally limited. While most officers were Serbs, the force included Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims), ethnic Hungarians, a small number of ethnic Albanians, and other ethnic minorities. The multiethnic police force in southern Serbia was composed primarily of ethnic Albanians and Serbs.

Corruption and impunity in the police force were problems, and there were only limited institutional means of overseeing and controlling police behavior. The inspector general's office, created in 2003, had increasingly limited authority, and the office had no autonomy to investigate and redress abuses. While the office recommended numerous disciplinary proceedings against interior ministry employees since its establishment, it had no means of following up on proceedings, and some secretariats completely ignored its recommendations.

During the year the interior ministry inspector general's office recommended disciplinary measures against ministry employees, leading to 856 cases that resulted in financial penalties, reassignments, and dismissals. The office filed 29 criminal complaints against 48 ministry employees on charges including forgery, misuse of public funds, corruption, accepting bribes, assault, and incompetence.

The Center of Public Security also took disciplinary measures against interior ministry employees, including submitting 1 employee for precriminal investigation, dismissing 7, opening a misdemeanor investigation of 1, reassigning 23, and reducing the salary of 9. In 63 cases, the center filed reports with department chiefs, who dismissed 33 employees, reassigned 45 to lower positions, reassigned 2 to equal positions, and reduced the salary of 141.

During the year the government and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) trained police, including on community relations. A foreign government also sponsored police training programs on witness protection and corruption.

Arrest and Detention

Arrests were generally based on warrants, although police were authorized to make arrests without a warrant in limited circumstances, including if there was a well-founded suspicion that a person had committed a capital crime. The law requires an investigating judge to approve any detention over 48 hours, and authorities respected this requirement in practice. Bail was allowed but rarely used; detainees facing charges that carried possible sentences of less than five years were often released on their own recognizance.

The law provides that the police must inform arrested persons immediately of their rights. While police usually did so in practice, some abuses were reported (see section 1.c.).

The law provides access for detainees to counsel, at government expense if necessary, and this right was generally respected in practice. Unlike the previous year, there were no reports that police pressured attorneys to limit their contact with detainees. Family members were normally able to visit detainees. Suspects can be detained for up to six months without being charged.

The law prohibits the use of force, threats, deception, and coercion, as well as use in court of evidence acquired by such means; however, police sometimes used these means to obtain statements.

Authorities used arbitrary arrest and selective enforcement of the law for political purposes, particularly to undermine the credibility and reputation of those critical of the government.

On March 22, the government arrested then Belgrade police chief Milan Obradovic and charged him with permitting the beating of a murder suspect. Details of the charges were leaked to the media, and observers believed the arrest was politically motivated. The government released Obradovic after 60 days in detention and dropped the criminal investigation; however, the investigation was pending at year's end, and the interior ministry carried out disciplinary measures against Obradovic, first suspending him for four months, reducing his pay by 20 percent, and demoting him to a low-ranking position in the provinces, then further reducing his pay and classifying his position as unassigned.

On September 28, the government arrested former minister of justice Vladan Batic on charges related to the release from prison of a member of the so-called Jotka group in 2003. Batic said he was acting upon the Constitutional Court's ruling that holding these prisoners was unconstitutional. Human rights organizations criticized the arrest as politically motivated, stemming from Batic's regular and public criticism of the government. No charges were raised, and Batic was released within 48 hours.

Shortly after Batic's arrest, police arrested Dragan Vulic, former assistant minister in charge of Serbian correctional facilities, also in connection with the release of the Jotka member. Human rights organizations again decried this arrest and detention as selective enforcement of rule of law to punish allies of former prime minister Djindjic. Vulic was released after 30 days in detention.

The law limits the length of pretrial detention from indictment to the conclusion of a trial to 2 years for most cases, but allows detention for up to 4 years for crimes that carry up to the maximum penalty (40 years in prison). The law sets 2 years as the maximum detention permitted after an appellate court vacates the judgment of a trial court. Nonetheless, prolonged pretrial detention was a problem. The law prohibits excessive delays by authorities in filing formal charges against suspects and in opening investigations; however, such delays continued regularly. Due to the inefficiency of the courts, cases often took an excessively long time to come to trial, and once started, trials often took an excessively long time to complete (see section 1.e.).

Persons detained for serious crimes generally were held for the full six months allowed before charges are required to be filed.

e. Denial of Fair Public Trial

The law provides for an independent judiciary; however, the courts remained susceptible to corruption and political influence.

Corruption in the judiciary remained a problem. There were reports that government officials attempted to undermine politically sensitive prosecutions, including by applying pressure on prosecutors. On September 16, authorities arrested Supreme Court judge Slavoljub Vuckovic and charged him with accepting a bribe in the Jotka organized crime case.

On October 14, a court resumed the trial of former deputy public prosecutor Milan Sarajlic, who was charged with accepting payments from the Zemun organized crime clan in 2004; the trial had been put on hold due to Sarajlic's poor health in 2004.

The private sector still considered corruption in the commercial courts to be widespread. In addition land transfers often were extremely difficult, leading many in the private sector to allege administrative corruption.

The courts were highly inefficient, and cases could take years to be resolved.

The court of the state union is responsible for coordinating jurisprudence in the state union, resolving jurisdictional disputes between Serbian and Montenegrin institutions, ruling on alleged violations of rights guaranteed by the state union constitutional charter, and settling disputes that the state union's joint customs office is unable to resolve. The court was established in 2004, but no cases had been brought before it by year's end.

The Serbian judicial system consists of municipal courts, district courts, a Supreme Court, and a Constitutional Court. In addition, the law provides for special courts for war crimes and organized crime; these were operational during the year within the Belgrade district court. The Constitutional Court rules on the constitutionality of laws and regulations. While the law provides for an administrative appeals court and a second instance appeals court to reduce the Supreme Court's caseload, the National Assembly has postponed the establishment of the courts until 2007.

The government disbanded military courts on January 1. A special branch in each district court assumed responsibility for military cases.

Trial Procedures

Trials are generally public, but they are closed during testimony of a state witness. There are no juries. The law provides that defendants are presumed innocent and have the right to have an attorney represent them at public expense, if needed, and to be present at their trials. Both the defense and the prosecution have the right to appeal a verdict. Defendants have the right to access government-held evidence and question witnesses. These rights were generally respected in practice.

The special war crimes court continued trying war crimes cases, some of which concluded with long-awaited indictments and sentences. On June 17, the court concluded the retrial of Aleksandar Cvjetan for the 1999 killing of 19 ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. In March 2004 a court sentenced Cvjetan to 20 years in prison, but the Supreme Court subsequently ordered a retrial. The war crimes court confirmed the original 20-year sentence; however, the decision was pending on appeal in the Supreme Court at year's end.

The Belgrade district court also tried Dejan Demirovic in absentia for the Podujevo killings and obtained his extradition from Canada; Demirovic was in custody pending trial at year's end.

On July 15, the special war crimes court concluded the retrial, ordered by the Supreme Court in 2004, of the Sjeverin war crimes case involving the torture and killing of 16 Muslims in 1992. The court confirmed the original conviction and sentencing of Dragutin Dragicevic, Oliver Krsmanovic, and ICTY indictee Milan Lukic to 20 years in prison, and Djordje Sevic to 15 years in prison. The court's decision was pending on appeal in the Supreme Court at year's end. In August authorities in Argentina arrested Lukic, and his extradition to the ICTY was pending at year's end.

The special war crimes court commenced several trials during the year. On October 12, it began the trial of Anton Lekaj, who was accused of the 1999 murder and torture of Roma in Kosovo during a wedding procession. On December 12, the court passed its first verdict in the Ovcara case (also known as the Vukovar massacre), convicting 14 Serbs of murder, torture, and inhumane treatment of more than 200 Croatian prisoners of war in 1991. The convictions can be appealed to the Supreme Court.

The special war crimes court made preparation for two additional trials. In August the court indicted seven persons in the Zvornik case involving the 1992 eviction and murder of Bosnian Muslims. In October the court indicted six persons in the Scorpions case involving the execution of six Bosnian Muslim civilians from Srebrenica in 1995.

Political Prisoners

There were no reports of political prisoners.

Property Restitution

During the year a government commission began preparing a register of property seized since 1945, but it made no progress on enacting a property restitution law or returning property.

f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence

The law prohibits such actions; however, the government interfered with privacy and correspondence. While the law requires the interior ministry to obtain a court order before monitoring potential criminal activity and police to obtain a warrant before entering property except to save people or possessions, police occasionally did not respect these provisions in practice.

Most observers believed that authorities selectively monitored communications, eavesdropped on conversations, read mail and e-mail, and tapped telephones. Human rights leaders frequently reported that their communications were being monitored.

On October 20, the Serbian post office confiscated promotional materials (such as leaflets, lighters, pens) of the Movement for an Independent Montenegro while the group was in Belgrade for a news conference. Authorities explained that the materials contained "politically unacceptable content," but the group claimed the post office screened mail without a court order and illegally confiscated materials.

Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

a. Freedom of Speech and the Press

The law provides for freedom of speech and of the press; however, there were reports of government interference in these freedoms and reprisals against persons who criticized the government.

In general, independent media organizations were active and expressed a wide range of views; however, some media organizations experienced threats and reprisals for publicizing views critical of the government, and many reporters lacked professionalism in citing sources and achieving accuracy.

The government published the daily Borba and owned one of the country's most important printing houses, also named Borba. The oldest nationwide daily, Politika, was co-owned by a German company and the government but operated by several shareholding companies.

State-controlled Radio-Television Serbia (RTS) was a major presence, operating three television channels as well as radio service. The government had considerable influence, although not formal control, over other major television stations, including TV Politika and TV Novi Sad, as well as Radio Belgrade's three stations. In addition, many television stations relied on the state-owned news agency Tanjug for news information. While RTS's coverage was generally objective, there occasionally appeared to be a bias toward the government.

In August parliament amended the broadcast law to postpone the privatization of local broadcast media until the end of 2008 and give government appointees to the broadcasting council six-year terms in office, while persons appointed by NGOs and professional organizations would serve for four years.

Media organizations, particularly the radio station B92, were victims of vandalism, bomb threats, and intimidation for coverage of views unpopular with the government.

Local government leaders in Vranje reportedly harassed OK Radio reporters, and several reporters received death threats, following the radio's September 2004 report that 2,500 ballots had been printed illegally for the local elections there. The report was confirmed by the Center for Free Elections and Democracy.

Libel is a criminal offense. In September the Serbian parliament adopted a new penal code that replaces imprisonment with fines of $552 to $13,800 (460 euros to 11,500 euros) as punishment for libel.

In March the Vranje committee of the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) charged Goran Vladkovic, editor-in-chief of OK Radio, with disseminating false information and libel in connection with the radio's September 2004 report on the illegal printing of ballots for a municipal election. The SPS sought over $343 thousand (24 million dinars) in compensation for alleged damages. A trial was pending at year's end, and OK Radio reported numerous threats and break-ins of its offices.

Journalists sometimes practiced self-censorship because of possible libel suits and fear of offending public opinion, particularly on subjects relating to wars in the former Yugoslavia.

While there were no government restrictions on the Internet or academic freedom, there were reports that the government selectively monitored e-mail correspondence.

b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association

Freedom of Assembly

The law provides for freedom of assembly, and the government usually respected it in practice; however, authorities occasionally impeded public protests.

On March 30, police prevented approximately 300 members of the Association of Free and Independent Unions from protesting in front of a Serbian government building.

On July 10, members of the Women in Black organization gathered in Belgrade to commemorate the tenth anniversary of the Srebrenica killings in Bosnia and Herzegovina. While the government provided security and did not interfere with the event, which was organized by an outspoken critic of the government, some human rights groups criticized police for not responding adequately to threats and tear gas used by other groups against participants.

Freedom of Association

The law provides for freedom of association, and the government generally respected it in practice.

c. Freedom of Religion

The law provides for freedom of religion, and the government generally respected this right in practice; however, the Serbian government maintained a discriminatory property tax.

While there is no state religion, the majority Serbian Orthodox Church received some preferential treatment. For example, the military continued to offer only Serbian Orthodox services, although it allowed members of other faiths to attend religious services outside their posts. There were also complaints that the Serbian government funded construction of a large Serbian Orthodox Church by raising postal charges. The Serbian government subsidized salaries of Serbian Orthodox clergy in Kosovo.

Although there is no formal registration requirement for religious organizations, any group planning to hold gatherings is required to register with local police. Religious organizations may register as citizen groups with the interior ministry in order to gain the legal status necessary to own real estate and conduct other transactions.

Serbian tax law exempts property owned by 7 traditional religious groups (the Serbian Orthodox Church, the Muslim community, the Roman Catholic Church, the Slovak Evangelical Church, the Jewish community, the Reform Christian Church, and the Evangelical Christian Church) from taxation but requires tax to be paid on property owned by any of the country's 182 other religious communities. Some religious organizations received tax notices during the year; the tax was expected to have the greatest impact on the smaller, unrecognized religious communities, such as the Adventist Church, which holds approximately 200 properties in the country.

A number of religious groups reported problems dealing with local government authorities.

Non-Orthodox religious organizations continued to report difficulty obtaining permission from local authorities in Serbia to build new worship facilities. The Belgrade Islamic community reported continued difficulties in acquiring land and government approval for an Islamic cemetery in the city.

During the year the municipal council for the prevention of addictions and religious sects in the town of Leskovac identified Adventists, Baptists, Pentecostals, the Evangelical Church, Jehovah's Witnesses, and "Satanists" as sects and promoted propaganda against them.

Local authorities ordered the demolition of a Romanian Orthodox church built on private land in the village of Malajnica. Authorities reportedly acted because the local Serbian Orthodox clergy had not approved the church. The case was before the Serbian Supreme Court at year's end. In May a local Romanian Orthodox priest who led a religious procession without police permission was charged with inciting religious hatred but was acquitted.

Serbian law requires students in primary and secondary schools either to attend classes from one of the seven traditional religious communities or, alternatively, to take a class in civic education. Leaders of religions groups excluded from the program continued to express their dissatisfaction at the government's narrow definition of religion.

The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints reported one case of the government restricting the import of religious material. Church members attempted to bring religious materials from Bulgaria, but border police refused them entry until they emptied the materials from their vehicles.

There was no progress noted during the year on restitution of previously seized religious property. The government reported that it was near to completing a register of seized religious property. As a temporary measure, a few religious communities have been granted free use of some facilities that had been seized from them. There was no progress noted in drafting a law on restitution of religious property in Serbia.

Societal Abuses and Discrimination

Religion and ethnicity are closely related; in many cases, it was difficult to identify discriminatory acts as being either primarily religious or primarily ethnic in motivation. Minority religious communities reported continuing problems with vandalism of church buildings, cemeteries, and other religious sites. Many attacks involved spray-painted graffiti, rock throwing, or the defacing of tombstones, while a few cases involved much more extensive damage. The police response was often inadequate.

Members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints in Belgrade reported several incidents to police during the year when they were physically assaulted by youths; in one of these incidents, a church member lost consciousness after being beaten in a park. The police told the members that nothing could be done, since the perpetrators were minors.

During the year courts made progress in several of the trials connected to attacks against mosques in Belgrade and Nis in apparent response to violence against the Serb community in Kosovo in March 2004.

In April a court sentenced 1 person arrested in connection with the burning of a Belgrade mosque to three months in prison; the trial of 10 other persons indicted in the attack continued at year's end. The Serbian government repaired the outside of the mosque but had not yet repaired the interior.

In July a Nis municipal court convicted and sentenced eight persons to spend three to five months in prison for the March 2004 burning of the Islam-Aga mosque in Nis. Muslim leaders criticized the sentences as too lenient.

The Jewish community had fewer than four thousand persons. Representatives of the Union of Jewish Communities of Serbia and Montenegro reported continued incidents of anti-Semitism but no physical violence against Jewish persons. There were several reports of anti-Semitic graffiti and vandalism at a few Jewish cemeteries. In addition the release of foreign anti-Semitic literature translated into Serbian often led to a spike in hate mail and other expressions of anti-Semitism.

For a more detailed discussion, see the 2005 International Religious Freedom Report.

d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation

The law provides for these rights, and the government generally respected them in practice. The law prohibits forced exile, and the government did not employ it.

Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)

According to official figures of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), there were approximately 208 thousand IDPs from Kosovo in Serbia, mainly Serbs, Roma, and Bosniaks as a result of the 1999 events in Kosovo. Approximately nine thousand remained in collective centers that were inadequate for any purpose other than as emergency shelter.

The state union government did not screen or assume responsibility for the six thousand IDPs that the ICRC ceased supporting when its mandate expired in 2004; however, it continued to pay salaries to IDPs who were in the Kosovar government before June 1999. In order to obtain temporary residence status in Serbia, the law requires IDPs to first return to Kosovo and deregister themselves from their previous address. Failure to complete this process effectively prevents IDPs from obtaining access to health insurance, social welfare, and public schools.

In 2004 the Serbian government signed agreements with 13 countries. During the year it signed agreements with 2 additional countries to accept unsuccessful migrants and persons without legal residence in those countries, who were primarily Roma. The Serbian Red Cross opened an office at the Belgrade airport to assist returning Roma.

The UNHCR estimated that there were 40 to 45 thousand displaced Roma living in Serbia proper; half of those were not registered due to lack of documents. Many Kosovar Roma were perceived to be Serb collaborators during the conflict in Kosovo and could not safely return there. Living conditions for Roma in Serbia were extremely poor. Local municipalities often were reluctant to accommodate them, hoping that, if they failed to provide shelter, the Roma would leave the community (see section 5). If Roma did settle, it was often in official collective centers with minimum amenities or, more often, in makeshift camps in or near major cities or towns.

There were sporadic incidents of attacks and vandalism against IDPs, particularly ethnic Ashkalis. In Vojvodina, several Ashkali houses were vandalized during the year.

Protection of Refugees

The law does not provide for the granting of asylum or refugee status in accordance with the 1951 UN Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 protocol. The state union has adopted a law on asylum that provides a framework but does not mention procedures or implementation. The government, on the republic level, has not passed legislation or established a system for providing protection to refugees. In practice the government may provide protection against refoulement, the return of persons to a country where they feared persecution, and UNHCR grants the refugee status. Forty-four persons were granted refugee status during the year.

The government provided temporary protection to individuals from Bosnia and Herzegovina and from Croatia who may not qualify as refugees under the 1951 convention and its 1967 protocol.

According to the 2005 refugee re-registration process, there were approximately 140 thousand refugees in Serbia from other successor states of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, primarily Croatia (100 thousand) and Bosnia and Herzegovina (40 thousand). The government, with UNHCR support, worked to close the remaining collective centers for refugees by establishing qualifications for persons to remain at the centers and by seeking alternate housing for others. Approximately six thousand refugees remained in collective centers in Serbia at year's end.

Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to Change Their Government

The law provides citizens with the right to change their government peacefully, and citizens exercised this right in practice through periodic elections held on the basis of universal suffrage.

Elections and Political Participation

The state union and the Serbian republic each have a parliamentary system of government. The state union parliament elects the state union president, while the president of the Serbian republic is elected by popular vote. On June 2, the Serbian National Assembly (parliament) adopted amendments to the state union's constitutional charter that postponed direct elections for the state union parliament and stipulated that state union and Serbian republic parliamentary elections take place separately.

An OSCE and Council of Europe election observation mission reported that the June 2004 Serbian republic presidential elections were peaceful and conducted essentially in line with international standards. Problems noted by the mission included lack of a central voter register, lack of facilities for eligible voters living in Montenegro, and evidence of some degree of disenfranchisement in the Romani community. Voting took place in Kosovo, where 97 thousand voters were registered; however, restrictions on movement hindered the ability of ethnic Serbs to vote, while the ethnic Albanian population, with very few exceptions, did not participate in the election, even in areas where some were on the voter lists.

An OSCE election observation mission reported that December 2003 Serbian republic parliamentary elections were conducted generally in line with international standards.

There were 13 women in the 126-seat state union parliament and 23 women in the 250-seat Serbian parliament. There were no women in the 5-member state union cabinet and 1 woman in the 16-member Serbian cabinet.

There were 7 members of minorities in the 126-seat state union parliament and 11 members of minorities in the 250-seat Serbian parliament. There was 1 member of a minority in the 5-member state union cabinet but no members of minorities in the 16-member Serbian cabinet.

Serbian law exempts ethnically based parties from the 5 percent threshold required for a political party to enter the Serbian parliament. Roma continued their historical pattern of low voter turnout. Local ethnic Albanian leaders in southern Serbia boycotted national elections notwithstanding their active involvement in local governance.

Government Corruption and Transparency

There was a widespread public perception of government corruption, and it appeared at every level. A Gallup survey released in March indicated that 60 percent of Serbians polled believed that government corruption was a major problem.

In June the government announced it would phase out the existing council for combating corruption, but it was unclear at year's end whether another body would replace it. During the year the council failed to investigate a number of corruption cases, including government contracts, questionable energy imports, and the use and sale of state-owned commercial office space.

Government authorities were inconsistent in their approach to official corruption. Investigations often appeared to be politically motivated and there are numerous examples of authorities failing to act in response to detailed reports of suspected corruption involving a wide range of officials. Media reporting of corruption was often sensationalist. Official anti-corruption bodies could be responsive and did have some success; however, there were cases where their efforts were blocked.

On September 8, Minister of Defense Prvoslav Davinic announced his resignation following the finance minister's criticism of his awarding of a $360 million (300 million euros) procurement contract in August as excessive, unjustified, and possibly corrupt. The contract allegedly involved the purchase of 74 thousand helmets and 69 thousand flak jackets for an army with only 28 thousand soldiers. Observers believed the accusations were politically motivated and stemmed from a rivalry between the two ministers. The Belgrade district court found no criminal wrongdoing in connection with the procurement but at year's end was investigating minor charges of misuse of office while Davinic was defense minister. The charges involved facilitating apartment leases for his bodyguards.

Authorities took no further action during the year against the interior ministry officials who were accused by the finance minister in September 2004 of having misappropriating public funds; observers believed the charges were politically motivated and lacked evidence.

Officials also engaged in questionable procedures in several high visibility privatizations, and the media reported that the political leadership overlooked and justice ministry officials ignored illegal transfers of funds made to government ministers.

The Serbian government's implementation of the November 2004 access to information law was slow, and the government generally did not provide access in practice. The law provides for public access to information of "legitimate public importance" (with many exceptions) and establishes an independent commissioner, selected by the Serbian parliament, to handle appeals when government agencies reject requests for information. NGOs reported that their requests for information from the government went unanswered.

Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human Rights

A variety of independent domestic and international human rights groups generally operated without government restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on human rights cases. However, these groups were often subjects of harassment, threats and libel suits for expressing views critical of the government. Prominent human rights groups included the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia, the Humanitarian Law Center, the Lawyers' Committee for Human Rights, the Fund for an Open Society, the Youth Initiative for Human Rights, and Belgrade Center for Human Rights.

After a video recording of the 1995 execution of six Srebrenica Muslims by a Serb paramilitary group called the "Skorpions" was shown on television on June 1, the Socialist Party of Serbia, the Serbian Radical Party, and the Democratic Party of Serbia accused the Humanitarian Law Center, other NGOs, and media outlets of conducting an anti-Serb campaign. Some NGO workers were subsequently threatened and attacked, primarily through media campaigns demonizing them and publication of personal information, such as their addresses.

The state union government does not have an autonomous human rights ombudsman; however, during the year the Serbian government established a new ombudsman's office in Belgrade. Vojvodina Province has an ombudsman, who operated independently during the year. The legal aid office in the state union Ministry for Human and Minority Rights also assisted citizens with human rights complaints.

The state union and Serbian governments made significant progress in their cooperation with the ICTY to apprehend and bring to justice war criminals; however, two of ICTY's most wanted war crimes suspects with links to Serbia, Ratko Mladic and Radovan Karadzic, remained at large. From January through April, Serb authorities assisted in the transfer of 13 indictees to the tribunal, with one additional transfer in September; however, six ICTY indictees with ties to the country remained at large, including key indictee Mladic. The state union and Serbian governments also made progress in complying with ICTY document requests and in facilitating the testimony of witnesses. The state union government's national cooperation council (NCC) transferred approximately 900 pages of documents to the ICTY prosecutor's office in response to requests for information, but outstanding requests remain. The NCC facilitated the testimony of 46 witnesses by granting waivers that freed potential witnesses from local prosecution under state secrets laws.

Section 5 Discrimination, Societal Abuses, and Trafficking in Persons

The law prohibits discrimination based on race, gender, disability, language, or social status; however, discrimination against women and ethnic minorities as well as trafficking in persons and violence against women and children were problems.

Women

Violence against women was a problem, and high levels of domestic violence persisted. The Serbian Victimology Society reported in July that one-third of women have been victims of physical violence, and half of women have been victims of psychological violence.

Domestic violence is a crime punishable by a prison sentence of 6 months to 10 years, depending on the seriousness of the offense, and a minimum of 10 years if death results. Such cases were difficult to prosecute due to lack of witnesses and evidence, as well as unwillingness of witnesses or victims to come forward. In a 2005 World Health Organization study of Serbian women, two-thirds of physically abused women reported that they did not seek help because they thought such abuse was normal or not serious. The few official agencies dedicated to coping with family violence had inadequate resources.

Rape, including spousal rape, is punishable by 1 year to the legal maximum sentence (40 years' imprisonment) for a simple case, a minimum of 3 years for an aggravated case, and a minimum of 5 years if death results or the victim is a minor. Only a small proportion of rapes were reported because victims feared that they would not be protected, that their attackers would take revenge, or that they would be humiliated in court. Few spousal rape victims filed complaints with authorities. Women's groups reported that sentences were often too lenient.

The Center for Autonomous Women's Rights in Belgrade offered a rape and spousal abuse hotline, and sponsored a number of self-help groups. The center also offered assistance to refugee women (mostly Serb), many of whom experienced extreme abuse or rape during the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia. The Counseling Center Against Family Violence operated a domestic violence shelter partly funded by the government.

Prostitution is illegal.

Trafficking in women for the purpose of sexual exploitation remained a problem (see section 5, Trafficking).

Sexual harassment was a common problem, but public awareness of it remained low. The law provides that sexual harassment is a crime punishable by up to six months' imprisonment for a simple case and by up to one year's imprisonment for abuse of a subordinate or dependent.

Women have the same legal rights as men, including under family law, property law, and in the judicial system. To ensure that women's rights are respected, the Serbian government established the council for gender equality in 2004. The Vojvodina government also has a secretariat for labor, employment, and gender equality. The OSCE mission to Serbia helped to establish municipal bodies in charge of gender equality in more than 30 municipalities.

Traditional views of gender roles, particularly in rural areas, resulted in discrimination against women. In remote rural areas, particularly among some minority communities, women could not effectively exercise their right to control property. In rural areas and some minority communities, it was common for husbands to direct the voting of wives.

The social status of women was generally considered inferior to that of men, and women were not well represented in commerce. Women were legally entitled to equal pay for equal work; however, according to the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, women's average wage was 11 percent lower than that of men.

Children

The government was committed to the rights and welfare of children. The educational system provided nine years of free, mandatory schooling. However, ethnic prejudice, cultural norms, and economic distress discouraged some children, particularly Roma, from attending school. One government survey found that approximately 99.8 percent of children attended school; however, the government acknowledged that the survey missed many transient Roma.

Romani education remained a problem. Many Romani children did not attend primary school, either for family reasons, because they were judged by school administrators to be unqualified, or because of societal prejudice. Due to the lack of primary schooling, many Romani children did not learn to speak Serbian. Some Romani children were placed mistakenly in schools for children with emotional disabilities because the Romani language and cultural norms made it difficult for them to succeed on standardized tests in Serbian. The UNHCR, with government support, conducted health education programs for Roma and catch-up and head-start programs for Romani children. During the year 48 elementary and secondary schools offered weekly Romani language and culture classes in which 1,336 students participated.

Free medical care was available in government clinics, including free medicines from a limited list of covered drugs. Boys and girls had equal access to medical care.

Child abuse was a widespread problem. While teachers were instructed to report suspected child abuse cases, they often did not do so. Police generally responded to complaints, and prosecutions of child abuse cases occurred during the year. Psychological and legal assistance was available for victims, and there was an incest trauma center.

Child marriage was a problem within some communities, particularly among Roma and in rural areas of southern and eastern Serbia. In the Romani community, boys and girls generally married between the ages of 14 and 18, with 16 as the average, and boys generally married a few years later than girls. Child marriage was most common among Muslim Roma, most of whom came from Kosovo and were living in other parts of the country as IDPs.

Trafficking of children for the purpose of sexual exploitation remained a problem (see section 5, Trafficking). Some Romani children were trafficked within the Romani community and to Roma abroad for exploitation in begging and theft rings.

Trafficking in Persons

The law prohibits trafficking in persons; however, trafficking in persons through and, to a lesser extent, to and from Serbia (excluding Kosovo) remained a problem. The penalty for trafficking is imprisonment of 1 to 10 years for a single offense, 3 to 40 years for multiple offenses, and 5 to 40 if a minor is involved or if a victim is killed.

The government's prosecution of trafficking cases became more effective, and courts handed down less lenient sentences for trafficking offenses than in previous years. On September 30, the special department of the Belgrade district court concluded a long-running and high-profile trafficking case involving Ukrainian victims, sentencing the organizer of the crime to eight years in prison and sentenced three others to three to six years in prison.

On December 28, the special court for organized crime concluded the 2004 case of 10 persons tried for trafficking women to Italy. The leader of the group, Dejan Stosic, received a four-year prison sentence; the others received sentences of 5 to 30 months.

During the year authorities filed 13 criminal charges against 21 persons for trafficking; antitrafficking groups worked with 113 trafficking victims and received 1,712 telephone calls on an SOS hotline for victims.

Serbian government antitrafficking efforts were led by an antitrafficking coordinator who was the chief of the border police and incorporated government agencies, NGOs, and international organizations. The state union ministries of foreign affairs and human and minority rights also participated. The government assisted in international investigations of human trafficking and participated in a regional antitrafficking operation.

With financial assistance and training from the international community, a witness protection unit became fully functional during the year. In addition reports suggested that police increasingly recognized and correctly assisted trafficking victims. For example, in February port of entry police recognized that an unescorted minor girl deported from Sweden with her two-year-old child and lacking paperwork was a trafficking victim and provided her assistance.

Serbia was a transit point, and to a lesser extent a point of origin and destination, for trafficking in women and girls for the purpose of sexual exploitation. Serbia was primarily a transit point for internationally trafficked women going to Kosovo as well as to Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania, and Western Europe. The primary source countries for persons trafficked to and through Serbia were Moldova, Ukraine, Romania, Russia, and Bulgaria. Approximately two thousand trafficking victims were in or passed through Serbia during the year, including women trafficked for sexual exploitation, children in begging rings, and exploited seasonal agricultural laborers.

Underage girls were among those trafficked for sexual exploitation. In November authorities rescued a 14-year-old girl at the Slovenian border from an international trafficking ring attempting to take her to the Netherlands for work and sexual exploitation. Her family in Prokuplje had sold her for $3,600 (3 thousand euros); the parents stated they thought their daughter would be staying with an aunt and attending school in the Netherlands. Two Croatians and two citizens of the Netherlands were arrested for trafficking the girl.

While Serbia was not traditionally a major source for trafficked women, poor economic conditions have increased women's vulnerability to traffickers, particularly in the Romani community. Trafficking of children by Roma for use in begging or theft rings was a problem.

Traffickers recruited victims through enticements including advertisements for escorts, marriage offers, and offers of employment. Women often went to work as prostitutes knowingly and only later became trafficking victims. In many cases international organized crime networks recruited, transported, sold, and controlled victims. The main points in Serbia for holding and transferring trafficked women were the Belgrade suburbs and Pancevo.

Authorities encouraged victims to participate in trials of traffickers and did not prosecute victims.

The government's agency for coordination of protection to victims worked to ensure that trafficking victims were correctly identified and referred to assistance providers. Separate shelters for domestic and foreign trafficking victims operated during the year. The NGO Astra operated a hotline for trafficking victims. NGOs and volunteers provided legal, medical, psychological, and other assistance to victims.

The International Organization for Migration (IOM) managed repatriation of foreign victims and assisted in the reintegration of local victims. The IOM also ran a regional clearing center for information on trafficking victims. There were numerous training programs, including training for hotline volunteers, shelters, social welfare officers, and police.

Serbian government and NGO public awareness efforts to combat trafficking included conferences on trafficking, documentary films shown across Serbia, and school outreach programs.

Persons with Disabilities

The law prohibits discrimination against persons with disabilities in employment, education, access to health care, or in the provision of other state services, and the government generally enforced the law. There were no reports of discrimination against persons with physical or mental disability; however, facilities for their education and care were nonexistent or inadequate, and the government did not address the problem. A high unemployment rate and lack of accommodations made it difficult for persons with disabilities to obtain employment.

The law mandates access for persons with disabilities to new public buildings, and the government generally enforced this provision in practice.

National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities

Minorities constituted 25 to 30 percent of Serbia's population and included Hungarians, Bosniaks, Roma, Slovaks, Romanians, Vlachs, Bulgarians, Croats, Albanians, and others.

Although not widespread, there continued to be incidents of vandalism and some physical attacks against minorities, mainly Hungarians in Vojvodina. The number of incidents against minorities in Vojvodina decreased compared with 2004.

In October the European Parliament adopted a resolution asserting that the rights of minorities were being violated in Vojvodina and noting several cases of vandalism, verbal abuse, and physical attacks on ethnic Hungarians. On October 10, the NGO Human Rights Watch released a report on violence against minorities in Serbia that reached similar conclusions. The Serbian and state union government responded with increased engagement with ethnic minority leaders in Vojvodina. The Serbian government agreed to a 10-point strategy for improving ethnic relations in the province, including education and public awareness campaigns, and support for greater representation of minorities in the police and judiciary.

On November 9, a neo-Nazi group disrupted an anti-Fascist seminar at Novi Sad University in Vojvodina, harassing and slapping participants. Authorities charged 18 men with inciting ethnic, racial, and religious hatred and intolerance. In the weeks following this incident, the Serbian Ministry of Interior officially identified several neo-Nazi groups by name.

Ethnic Albanian leaders of the southern municipalities of Presevo, Bujanovac, and Medvedja continued to complain about the under-representation of ethnic Albanians in government structures. Dissatisfaction became particularly strong after army border guards shot and killed a 16-year-old ethnic Albanian in January as he was trying to cross the border with Macedonia illegally. A working group made up of interior ministry, OSCE, the coordination body for Southern Serbia, and municipal representatives addressed concerns between the ethnic Albanian community and police.

There were a few reports that police failed to take action to stop armed highway robberies that have occurred since mid-2004. Masked men claiming to belong to the Albanian National Army demanded money from drivers, mainly ethnic Albanian guest workers returning to Kosovo for the summer holidays.

Roma continued to be targets of numerous incidents of police violence, verbal and physical harassment from ordinary citizens, and societal discrimination. Police made modest improvements in investigating cases of societal violence against Roma. Twice during the year unknown persons attacked Romani settlements with Molotov cocktails; police investigated and pressed criminal charges against the assailants.

Many Roma, including IDPs from Kosovo, lived illegally in squatter settlements that lacked basic services such as schools, medical care, water, and sewage facilities. Some settlements were located on valuable industrial or commercial sites where private owners wanted to resume control; others were on the premises of state-owned enterprises due to be privatized. During the year Belgrade authorities continued to suspend demolition of one settlement on privatized land until they could locate alternative housing for Roma living there.

At year's end the prosecutor's office had not completed investigating the 2003 case of six Luzane villagers accused of attacking a Romani family.

During the year Belgrade authorities established a Romani coordination center and purchased land for the construction of an apartment complex for Roma; construction had not begun at year's end.

To address concerns of minorities, the state union Ministry for Human and Minority Rights operated a hotline for minorities and others concerned about human rights problems. Callers to the hotline most commonly reported being the victim of threats, ethnic slurs, and bullying. The government also sponsored several school programs to educate children about minority cultures and to promote tolerance.

Other Societal Abuses and Discrimination

Violence and discrimination against homosexuals was a problem. The media carried slurs against homosexuals. Some NGOs reported that homosexuals were denied equal opportunities in education and employment. A survey by the Youth Initiatives for Human Rights indicated that lesbians, gays, bisexuals, and transgender persons experienced widespread threats, hate speech, verbal assault, and physical violence.

Section 6 Worker Rights

a. The Right of Association

The law provides the right for workers, except military and police personnel, to join or form unions of their choosing, subject to restrictions, including approval by the Ministry of Labor and a statement from the employer that the union leader is a full-time employee, which reportedly was tantamount to an employer approval requirement. A state-affiliated trade union federation dominated organized labor, due to preference for unions belonging to it by the managements of the state-owned industries that dominated the economy. Smaller federations of independent trade unions competed with the government-affiliated federation, but were successful in doing so primarily in the relatively small proportion of the formal nonagricultural economy that is not state-owned. In the state-owned sector, 60 to 70 percent of workers belonged to unions. In the private sector, only 4 to 6 percent were unionized, and in agriculture approximately 3 percent.

The law does not prohibit antiunion discrimination, and it was not a significant problem during the year.

b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively

The law allows unions to conduct their activities without interference, and the government protected this right in practice. The law protects the right to organize and bargain collectively, and it was exercised freely in practice. The new labor law implemented in March requires collective bargaining agreements for any company with more than 10 employees. However, in order to negotiate with an employer, a union must have 15 percent of company employees as members. In order to negotiate with the government, a union must have 10 percent of all workforce employees as members. Wage arrears were reported to be substantial and widespread. Approximately 27 percent of the workforce was covered by collective bargaining agreements.

The law provides for the right to strike except by persons providing essential services such as education, electric power, and postal service. These employees constitute approximately 50 percent of the workforce and must announce planned strikes at least 15 days in advance and ensure that a "minimum level of work" is provided. Workers exercised the right to strike.

There are no export processing zones.

c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor

The law prohibits forced and compulsory labor, including by children; however, there were reports that such practices occurred (see sections 5 and 6.d.).

d. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment

The government effectively enforced laws protecting children from exploitation in the workforce. The minimum age for employment is 16, although in villages and farming communities it was common to find younger children at work assisting their families. Children, particularly Roma, also worked in a variety of unofficial retail jobs, typically washing car windows or selling small items such as newspapers. Romani children were often forced by their families into manual labor, compelled to beg, or trafficked abroad to work in begging or theft rings. The Labor Inspectorate of the Ministry of Labor, Employment, and Social Issues checked for child labor during its inspections; however, the ministry stated it found no violations during the year. The ministry also included prevention of child labor in its regular child and family protection programs.

e. Acceptable Conditions of Work

In Serbia, the minimum wage for the period July-December was set by the Social Economic Council at approximately $105 (7,400 dinars) per month. The minimum wage did not provide a decent standard of living for a worker and family. In companies with a trade union presence, there was generally effective enforcement of the minimum wage. This was not the case in smaller private companies, and workers were often afraid of losing their jobs because many of them were not legally registered. The Labor Inspectorate is responsible for enforcing the minimum wage.

The standard workweek of 40 hours was generally followed in state-owned enterprises but not in private companies. The law provides that an employee may not work overtime for more than 4 hours a day or for more than 240 hours in a calendar year. For an 8-hour workday, one 30-minute break is required. At least 12 hours of break are required between shifts during a workweek, and at least 24 hours of break are required over a weekend.

Collective agreements were the primarily means of providing premium pay for overtime. However, the new labor law requires that the premium for overtime work should be at least 26 percent of the salary base, as defined by the relevant collective agreement. Trade unions within a company are the primary agents for enforcing overtime pay; however, the Labor Inspectorate also has enforcement responsibilities. The inspectorate had mixed results enforcing labor regulation due to a variety of factors, including politics and corruption.

It is mandatory for companies to establish a safety and security unit to implement safety and security regulations; however, in practice these units often focused on rudimentary aspects of safety, such as purchasing soaps and detergents, rather than on providing safety equipment for workers. Workers did not have the right to remove themselves from situations that endangered health or safety without jeopardy to their employment.

KOSOVO

Kosovo has a population of approximately 2.2 million and is administered by the UN Interim Administrative Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) pursuant to UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1244. UNMIK promulgated regulations that addressed the civil and legal responsibilities of governmental entities and private individuals and ratified laws passed by the Kosovo Assembly. The UNMIK-promulgated Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government in Kosovo (the constitutional framework) defines the provisional institutions of self government (PISG). Multiparty elections in October 2004 for seats in the Assembly were generally free and fair. UNMIK international civilian authorities and a UN-authorized North Atlantic Treaty Organization peacekeeping force for Kosovo (KFOR) generally maintained effective control over security forces; however, there were reports that local elements of the security forces acted independently of their respective authority.

UNMIK and the PISG generally respected the human rights of residents; however, there were serious problems in some areas, particularly relating to minority populations. The following human rights problems were reported:

• politically and ethnically motivated killings
• deaths and injuries from unexploded ordnance or landmines
• lengthy pretrial detention and lack of judicial due process
• corruption and government interference in the judiciary
• attacks and harassment against journalists
• societal antipathy against Serbs and the Serbian Orthodox Church
• restrictions on freedom of movement for minorities, particularly ethnic Serbs
• lack of progress returning internally displaced persons to their homes
• a widespread perception of corruption in the PISG
• violence and discrimination against women
• trafficking in persons, particularly girls and women for sexual exploitation
• societal violence, abuse, and discrimination against minority communities
• societal discrimination against persons with disabilities
• child labor in the informal sector
  

RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person

a. Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life

There were no reports that UNMIK, the PISG, KFOR, or their agents committed unlawful or arbitrary killings.

During the year unexploded ordnance from the 1999 conflict or landmines killed two children and seriously injured three, compared with one fatality and 13 serious injuries in 2004. Unexploded ordnance remained a threat to civilians.

There was one apparent politically motivated killing of a police officer. On January 13, unknown persons detonated a bomb under an official UNMIK vehicle, killing Omar Ali, an UNMIK police officer.

On April 7, authorities charged Shkumbin Mehmeti, Florim Ejupi, Xhavit Kosumi, and Faik Shaqiri with murder for the killing of a Kosovo Police Service (KPS) officer and an UNMIK police officer in Podujeve/Podujevo municipality after the March 2004 riots. All remained in custody awaiting trial at year's end.

There were apparent politically motivated killings of ethnic Albanians. On January 31, unknown persons shot and killed Sadik Musaj, a witness at the "Dukagjini group" trial. On April 6, unknown persons killed Muhamet Sallaj, a former Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) member. On April 15, unknown persons killed Enver Haradinaj, brother of former prime minister and Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AAK) President Ramush Haradinaj; on July 25, Tasim Osaja, a suspect in the killing, turned himself in to police in response to a warrant for his arrest. On June 4, unknown persons shot journalist Bardil Ajeti of the Albanian language daily Bota Sot in a drive-by shooting; Ajeti died 20 days later from his injuries. In another drive-by shooting on July 12, unknown persons killed Muhamet Xhemajili, former commander of the UCPMB, the armed ethnic Albanian group previously active in Serbia's Presevo Valley. On September 5, a car explosion killed Kosovo Protection Corps and former KLA member, Naser Ramaj and his brother Jeton. On October 10, unknown persons shot and killed Hasan Rrustemi, a witness in the pending war crimes trial of former KLA (and former Kosovo Protection Corps) Commander Selimi Krasniqi.

There were apparent ethnically motivated killings of Serbs during the year. On August 28, unknown persons shot and killed Ivan Dejavnovic and Aleksandar Stankovic and injured two passengers in their car in the Serb-majority municipality of Strpce.

In a possible politically motivated attack, on October 11, unknown persons killed ethnic Turk Ibish Cakalli, a member of the Turk Democratic Party of Kosovo.

On May 18, an international panel of judges convicted six ethnic Albanians in connection with the killing of two ethnic Serbs during the March 2004 riots: Nexhat Ramadani was sentenced to 16 years, Xheladin Salihu to 11 years, Scaip Ibrahimi to 3˝ years, and Agron Ibrahimi, Agim Abdullahu and Sadri Shabani were each given 2˝ years in prison.

During the year a court acquitted Albanian Labinot Gashi, who was arrested by KPS police for the June 2004 killing of 17-year-old ethnic Serb Dimitrije Popovic and serious injury of another ethnic Serb teenager in a drive-by shooting. The trial of a second ethnic Albanian defendant, Albert Krasniqi, was ongoing at year's end.

There were no developments in the March 2004 killing of the father of Avni Elezaj, a former KLA fighter and bodyguard of former prime minister and AAK President Ramush Haradinaj.

There were no developments in the following 2003 cases: The killing of two witnesses in the Dukagjini group case, Tahir Zemaj and Ilir Selimaj; the sniper killing of UNMIK police officer Satish Menon; and the separate killings of KPS officers Hajdar Ahmeti and Agim Makolli. Bedri Krasniqi remained at large for the suspected 2003 killing of KPS members Sebahate Tolaj and Isuf Haklaj.

On April 7, authorities indicted Florim Ejupi on charges that he and accomplices planned and executed the 2001 Merdare bus bombing near Podujeve/Podujevo that killed 11 ethnic Serbs and wounded 40. A second April 7 indictment accused Ejupi, Shkumbin Mehmeti, Xavit Kosumi, and Faik Shaqiri of involvement in a March 2004 attack on international and KPS police at a road checkpoint established after the March 2004 riots.

b. Disappearance

There were no reports of politically motivated disappearances; however, there were still over two thousand persons missing from the 1999 conflict whose remains had not been identified or whereabouts determined.

A working group of Pristina and Belgrade officials on persons missing from the 1999 conflict met five times during the year under International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) auspices. During the year the group accounted for approximately 560 sets of human remains and added 57 persons previously unaccounted for to its list of the missing. According to the ICRC, 2,464 persons were unaccounted for as of December, compared with more than 3 thousand at the beginning of the year. Of those still unaccounted for, the ICRC reported that 75 percent were ethnic Albanians, 17 percent were ethnic Serbs, 4 percent were from the Roma, Ashkalia, and Egyptian communities, and 3 percent were from other ethnic groups.

During the year UNMIK's missing persons and forensics office continued to identify the remains of missing persons in Kosovo. From its establishment in 2002 through the end of the December, the office performed 446 field operations and exhumations. Many bodies of missing persons have been recovered and the focus was on establishing the identities of the 1,389 sets of human remains discovered and received since 2002. By October the missing persons and forensics office submitted 2,655 bone samples for DNA testing to the International Commission on Missing Persons, which had returned 1,484 results.

In April the Office of Missing Persons and Forensics began excavation of a cave and its surrounding area in Kline/Klina municipality that was used to dispose of 21 human remains.

UNMIK continued to encourage the Serbian government to accelerate its cooperation on transferring identified remains of Kosovar victims of the 1999 war found in mass graves in Serbia; however, progress was slow. The missing persons and forensics office received 638 bodies, most of which were returned to families for burial. Families of the missing continued to demand that the Serbian government return all Kosovar remains still in Serbia and provide access to government files that might indicate locations of additional mass graves or places where Kosovar bodies may have been incinerated.

In 2004 the Prizren prosecutor's office announced arrest warrants for two former ethnic Serb policemen, Goran Janjusevic and Slavisa Milkovic, for committing war crimes against the civilian population in the Prizren region, including the kidnapping and killing of Ardian Zyrnagjiu during the 1999 conflict. The suspects remained at large at year's end.

c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

The constitutional framework and criminal procedure code prohibit such practices, and there were no reports that UNMIK or KFOR employed them.

In June members of activist Albin Kurti's Kosovo Self-Determination movement began spray-painting their "no negotiation, self-determination" slogan on buildings and other property, escalating their activity during the year. On October 19, the KPS reportedly arrested and abused protestors, some of whom had spray-painted slogans on UN vehicles, following a demonstration in Pristina by members of the movement. In an October 25 letter to the UN special representative concerning the incident, Kosovo Ombudsperson Marek Nowicki cited eyewitness reports that "many" activists had experienced "severe ill-treatment" during their arrest and statements by persons who had been arrested that the ill-treatment continued after they had been taken into custody. An internal KPS investigation was ongoing at year's end.

Some individuals accused KFOR of using excessive force in executing searches. On September 18, UNMIK police and the KPS with KFOR support searched a private home and arrested four ethnic Serbs in Gracanica suspected of participating in a number of killings in Lipjan/Lipljan municipality in 1999. The family reported pushing and shoving by the KFOR soldiers and KPS officers who conducted the raid; the case was turned over to an international prosecutor, and the investigation was continuing at year's end.

On August 22, an international public prosecutor rejected a motion to allow the release of KPC Commander General Selim Krasniqi, under arrest with four other KPC officers for suspected involvement in 1998 abuse of persons in the Drenovac detention camp in the Prizren area. On August 22, the court released one of the five officers, Milaim Latifi, who was reinstated in the KPC.

There were reports of attacks and threats against ethnic Albanian political and institutional figures as well as private persons. On March 15, unknown persons detonated an explosive device near President Ibrahim Rugova's motorcade, causing injury to bystanders. On April 18, unknown persons detonated an explosive at the headquarters of the opposition political party Ora, injuring several persons in apartments above the offices. Nonpolitical motives, including clan rivalry and common criminality, were also suspected in some cases.

There were reports of politically motivated violence against ethnic Serbs during the year. On February 8, unknown persons destroyed the official vehicle of ethnic Serb leader Oliver Ivanovic with explosives, but caused no casualties. On July 4, unknown persons threw a hand grenade into the Zubin Potok offices of the Serbian Democratic Party for Kosovo and Metohija.

During the year authorities brought a number of persons to court for crimes related to the interethnic riots in March 2004 (see section 5).

Prison and Detention Center Conditions

Prison and detention centers generally met international standards, and UNMIK permitted visits by independent human rights observers; however, a local nongovernmental organization (NGO), Council for Defense of Human Rights and Freedoms (CDHRF), claimed that UNMIK prohibited it from visiting detainees in prisons and detention centers since May.

Facilities were at times overcrowded; however, the construction of two new facilities continued during the year. UNMIK police corrections officers managed prisons and detention centers but increasingly transferred responsibilities to the Kosovo Correctional Service.

There were prisons in Lipljan and Dubrava as well as five detention centers in operation during the year. The CDHRF reported receiving approximately 10 telephone calls a day from prisoners and their families charging abuse and excessive solitary confinement in prison. While women and juveniles are supposed to be held separately from men, the CDHRF stated that there were cases of women and juveniles being hel